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DALE B. THOMPSON*
Political Obstacles to the
Implementation of Emissions Markets:
Lessons from RECLAIM
ABSTRACT
Why have sofew emissions markets been implemented? This article
addresses this question by examining the political economy of the
REgional CLean Air Market (RECLAIM) for Los Angeles.
RECLAIM offers an excellent opportunity to study the political
obstacles of emissions markets, because its nitrogen oxides and
sulfur oxides component was implemented while its volatile organic
compounds component was not. By carefully analyzing the
decisions of the regulatory agency responsible for RECLAIM, this
article offers a precise explanation of the political obstacles faced by
an emissions market like RECLAIM. These obstacles include the
difficulty in extending markets to sources and products that were
previously unregulated under a command-and-control regime.
Also, political conflict arising because of uncertainty is more
contentious under emissions markets than under command-and-
control regulation. This article then offers suggestions for
improving the political feasibility of emissions markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Economists have frequently recommended the use of emissions
markets to reduce air pollution.1 They cite the cost advantages of markets
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over traditional command-and-control approaches, together with the
strong incentive that markets would promote technological change. With
these advantages, we might expect that emissions markets would be
widely used. However, very few markets have actually been implemented,
with the Acid Rain market being the most notable exception.2 Drawing on
our experience with the REgional CLean Air Market (RECLAIM) in Los
Angeles, this article identifies two general obstacles to the widespread
adoption of emissions markets. The first is the difficulty in extending
markets to sources and products that were previously unregulated under
a command-and-control (CAC) regime. Second, political conflict arising
because of uncertainty is more contentious under emissions markets than
under CAC.
Prior articles fail to offer an adequate explanation for the lack of
implementation of emissions markets. Part of this literature is a debate
between emissions markets advocates and advocates of command-and-
control (CAC).3 Many environmental groups, though not all," have sided
with the CAC advocates, but the opposition of these groups is an inade-
quate explanation for the low number of emissions markets. Another
portion of the literature has examined the need to design a market with low
transaction costs and well-defined property rights.5 However, if the savings
2. Actual emissions markets in the United States include the EPA Emissions Trading
program involving Bubbles and Netting, the Lead (in gasoline) Trading program, the
Chloroflurocarbon (CFC) program under the Montreal Protocol, the Acid Rain program, and
RECLAIM For analysis of the Emissions Trading program, see generally Richard Stewart,
Economics, Environment, and the Limits of LegalControl, 9 HARV. ENvTL L. REv. 1 (1985); Robert
W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions
Trading Program, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109 (1989). For the Lead Trading program, see generally
Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptionsfor Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the
Doctor's Orders, 3 1. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1989). For the CFC program, see generally Robert H.
Hahn & Albert McGartland, The Political Economy of Instrument Choice: An Examination of the
U.S. Role in Implementing the Montreal Protocol, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 592 (1989). For the Acid Rain
program, see generally Paul L. Joskow et al., The Market for Sulfur Dioxide Emissions, 88 AM.
ECON. REv. 669 (1998).
3. For market advocates, see for example, Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L REV. 1333 (1985); Robert H. Hahn & Gordon L.
Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions Trading Program, 6 YALE
J. ON REG. 109 (1989). For CAC advocates, see Howard Latin, Ideal versus Real Regulatory
Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reobrms, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1267 (1985).
4. The Environmental Defense Fund is the most notable exception. See Robert W. Hahn,
United States Environmental Policy, Past, Present and Future, 34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 305, 332
(1994).
5. See, e.g., Vivien Foster & Robert W. Hahn, Designing More Efficient Markets: Lessons
from Los Angeles Smog Control, 38 J.L. & ECON. 19, 44 (1995); Robert W. Hahn, Economic
Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor's Orders, 3 J. ECON.
PEsP. 95, 110 (1989); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for
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from emissions markets are truly as great as has been claimed, these
difficulties should be overcome.
Even articles focusing on the political economy of emissions
markets do not offer a sufficient explanation for the lack of implementation
of these markets. Some articles examine the political economy of how
permits are allocated in an established emissions market However, these
articles do not examine the political economy of barriers to the implementa-
tion of emissions markets.
Other articles suggest that the political opposition of affected
industries can be overcome through "grandfathering" mechanisms.
Neoclassical economic theory suggests we will see large efficiency gains
from adopting an incentive-based instrument such as an emissions market,
rather than using CAC. A politician can then redistribute these gains to
ensure a "Pareto-improving" outcome, where all parties are better off. This
redistribution of the efficiency gains makes it likely that competition
among interest groups will improve the efficiency of regulations7 by
adopting an instrument like an emissions market.
With emissions markets, this redistribution is accomplished
through a grandfathering mechanism. Under a grandfathering mechanism,
permits are given, at no cost, to prior emitters based on historical emis-
sions. When this is done, affected industries maintain the entitlement to
pollute that they have had under CAC regimes. They should therefore be
no worse off under an emissions market than under a CAC regime,
because they could then continue operating as before, using the permits
that have been given to them. This is in contrast to emission tax schemes
where the affected industries have to purchase the entitlement to pollute
Our experience with markets suggests that these grandfathering mecha-
nisms are important in securing the political support of the affected
regulated industries." Through grandfathering's redistribution of the large
gains available through the use of emissions markets, we thus should be
Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361,363 (1989); ROBERT N. STAVINS&ROBERT W. HAHN,
TRADING NGREENHOUSEPERMIrS:ACRITCALEXAMINATONOFDESIGNANDIMPLEMENrATION
IssuS (Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government Working Paper No. R93-15,1993).
6. See generally Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-
Based Environmental Policy: The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 41 J.L. & ECON. 37 (1998); Karl
Hausker, The Politics and Economics of Auction Design in the Market for Sulfur Dioxide Pollution,
11 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 19 (1995).
7. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groupsfor Political Influence,
98 Q.J. ECON. 371,373 (1983).
8. See James Buchanan & Gordon Tolluck, Polluters Profits and Political Response: Direct
Controls versus Taxes, 65 AM. ECON. REv. 139, 140 (1975).
9. See Robert H. Hahn & Albert McGartland, The Political Economy of Instrument Choice:
An Examination of the U.S. Role in Implementing the Montreal Protocol, 83 Nw.U. L. REV. 592,606
(1989).
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able to achieve the political acceptability of an emissions market. However,
very few emissions markets have been implemented. Concerns by affected
industries over loss of their entitlement to pollute are, therefore, also not an
adequate explanation for the lack of implementation of markets.
Some articles do mention possible political obstacles to emissions
markets presented by regulators and the regulated entities. These
discussions derive from lessons suggested by public choice theory." Public
choice theory suggests that there are political barriers presented by
organized interest groups that have a strong incentive to maintain the
status quo. 2 Regulators have an incentive to maintain the status quo
because a CAC system requires active management by these bureaucrats. 3
Meanwhile, industrial groups may also prefer a CAC system because it can
reduce entry and thereby limit competition. 4 They also may prefer their
more certain understanding of how a CAC system might operate in the
future to the uncertain operation of an emissions market. However, these
theories have been drawn from our experience with the CAC regulatory
system, not from an investigation of an actual emissions market proposal.
One article by Nathaniel Keohane, Richard Revesz, and Robert Stavins
16
does offer a framework for examining the political economy of instrument
choice in environmental policy. However, their ultimate conclusions on the
lack of implementation of emissions markets frequently echo the conclu-
sions based on public choice theories. They point to the support of
command-and-control regimes by existing firms, because their ability to
limit entry generates rents, 7 and also to the opposition of environmental
groups to incentive-based instruments. They do offer some more novel
explanations concerning the advantages that command-and-control
instruments offer legislators. The most interesting of these is the notion that
command-and-control instruments offer significant degrees of flexibility in
their relative impacts on different interest groups. This flexibility simplifies
10. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Search for Regulatory Alternatives, 15 STAN.
ENVTI. L.J. 8, 17-18 (1996).
11. For a good discussion of public choice theory and its application to environmental
regulation, see Jonathan B. Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global Environmental Regulation,
87 GEO. L.J. 749 (1999).
12. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN&WILLIAMT. HASsLERCLEAN COAL/DmY AIR 116-28
(1981); Robert Crandall, Economic Rents as a Barrier to Deregulation, 6 CATOJ. 173,192-93 (1986).
13. See Gordon Brady et al., Political Limits of the Market for BAT Medallions, 14 REG. 61,
63-64 (1990).
14. See Crandall supra note 12, at 173.
15. See Brady et al., supra note 13, at 63-64.
16. See Nathaniel Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental
Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 313 (1998).
17. Recall that limiting entry lessens competition. With less competition, existing firms
can generate rents through higher profits.
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the formation of majority coalitions necessary to enact these instruments.
Nevertheless, while incentive-based instruments may not be as flexible, the
substantial efficiency gains offered by these instruments should also be
sufficient to establish the necessary majority coalitions. Because the
obstacles noted by these and other authors can be overcome, other factors
must be preventing the implementation of these markets.
This article takes a more thorough approach to examining the
barriers to the implementation of an emissions market. It suggests that
political obstacles presented by affected producers and consumers are the
primary impediments to the widespread use of emissions markets. This is
true even when these markets distribute permits on a grandfathered basis,
and the affected facilities are not charged for these permits. This article
develops these conclusions through examining the political economy of the
RECLAIM emissions market for Southern California, which was under-
taken by the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD or
the District). RECLAIM presents an interesting opportunity for examining
impediments to the implementation of emissions markets. One portion of
RECLAIM, for nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx), was
implemented while another, for volatile organic compounds (VOC), was
not. By comparing these two case studies arising from RECLAIM, this
article draws analytical conclusions on the political obstacles to emissions
markets.
The conclusions drawn from RECLAIM suggest that the public
choice explanation of maintaining the status quo, as discussed above, is not
a sufficient explanation for the small number of implemented emissions
markets. In RECLAIM, we find that regulators will support the creation of
an emissions market, and regulated industries, under certain circum-
stances, will also support the creation of an emissions market. In RE-
CLAIM, we also see that the opposition of environmental groups to
emissions markets is an insufficient explanation. Closer inspection of our
experience with RECLAIM suggests a more complicated explanation of
political obstacles to emissions markets.
One obstacle arises because of the inadequacy of the grand-
fathering mechanism. Some groups will receive allocations of grand-
fathered permits, and those groups may then support the implementation
of the market. However, frequently there will be other groups in the chain
of production and consumption of the affected product that do not receive
these permits. These groups then may suffer substantial welfare losses
from the implementation of an emissions market. This result is in contrast
to the neoclassical economic notion that we can make all parties better off
by redistributing some of the efficiency gains from adopting an emissions
market.
This effect appeared during RECLAIM. Difficulties in enforcement
would mean that local drivers and local consumers of products emitting
Summer 20001
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VOCs would not receive allocations of grandfathered permits. At the same
time, inclusion of mobile sources and consumer products within the scope
of RECLAIM would result in higher prices for drivers and consumers
because the price would reflect the marginal opportunity cost of these
permits.18 Consequently, although inclusion would have been advanta-
geous for organized industrial sources, the District Board apparently feared
the possibility that a political entrepreneur might trigger a response by
local constituent drivers and consumers, as they instead decided to exclude
mobile sources and consumer products from the scope of RECLAIM.1' This
decision would later have a significant impact on the failure to implement
VOC RECLAIM, because VOC RECLAIM would have been more attractive
to businesses if these other sources were included. This experience suggests
that difficulties in compensating all affected parties may present a political
obstacle to the further implementation of emissions markets.
Another obstacle arose because of uncertain technological change.
Prior authors have examined the effects of uncertainty on the efficiency of
emissions markets." Uncertainty plays a new role in this case, a political
role. For RECLAIM, the method of determining allocations of future
permits depended upon estimation of future technologies and their
corresponding emissions rates."1 This estimate was fairly easy for the
NOx/SOx market, because the District had already adopted technological
rules for NOx and SOx sources with future implementation dates.' No
such rules exited for VOC sources. This led to a significant conflict in the
determination of future allocations for VOC RECLAIM.
While there will always be disagreements between industry and
regulators concerning future technologies to reduce emissions, there are
significant differences in the consequences of these disagreements under
an emissions market versus under CAC. Under CAC, an escape valve
exists for over-optimistic projections: if the expected technology does not
develop, the rule itself can be reevaluated. However, under an emissions
market, the emissions cap is much tighter: if the technology implied in the
18. As will be discussed later, these permits have opportunity costs because they can be
sold to firms emitting these pollutants.
19. See S. COAST AIR QuALrTY MANAGEMENT DST., RECLAIM, FEASimLIrY STUDY
SUMMARY: SUMMARY REcOMMENDATIONS 2-1 to 2-2 (1992) [hereinafter FEASIBLiTY SUMMARY
RECOMMENDATIONS]; S. Coast Air Quality Management Dist., I RECLAIM EX-7 (1994)
[hereinafter RECLAIM VOL I].
20. See generally Martin Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REv. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974);
Marc J. Roberts & Michael Spence, Effluent Charges and Licenses under Uncertainty, 5 J. PUB.
ECON. 193 (1976); Richard V. Butler & Michael D. Maher, The Control of Externalities in a
Growing Urban Economy, 20 ECON. INQUIRY 155 (1982).
21. See RECLAIM VOL. I, supra note 19, at EX-8.
22. See, e.g., id. at 5-15 to 5-16 tbl.5-2 (listing District Rules A-C-05, P-B-01, P-B-02, P-B-6,
P-C-02, P-C-04 to P-C-08, P-F-01, P-F-02).
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allocations does not develop, the sources from the affected industry will be
expected to purchase excess permits from other sources. No reallocation
based on the failed development of the technology will occur. This concern
was a significant factor in the political opposition of industrial sources to
the ultimate VOC RECLAIM proposal, and this opposition then doomed
the implementation of VOC RECLAIM.' Thus, we see that uncertain
technological change can also create significant political obstacles to the
implementation of an emissions market.
These lessons suggest that before we attempt to implement an
emissions market, we should be concerned with more than debates posed
by environmental groups and design problems concerning transaction
costs and the definition of property rights. Also, the prospective economic
benefits offered by emissions markets will not be the sole determinant of
whether these reforms will be politically feasible. Instead, we must search
for effects that may lead to the political opposition of producers and
consumers of products affected by the implementation of an emissions
market. These effects include the possibility that some groups may suffer
substantial welfare losses from the implementation of a market or the
uncertainty of technological change. These concerns must be addressed, or
the political acceptability of an emissions market will remain in doubt.
This article looks at the political obstacles that affected the
implementation of emissions markets in the Los Angeles Basin and uses the
lessons from that experience to suggest future political strategies in
emissions market implementation. Part II provides some background on
the regulation of air quality in Los Angeles, and then part Ill offers an
overview of the history of the RECLAIM program. Part IV offers a political
economy model to understand the decisions of the political regulators
responsible for RECLAIM. It then analyzes the decisions affecting the
implementation of NOx/SOx RECLAIM, and the failure to implement
VOC RECLAIM. Part V examines the political obstacles faced by RE-
CLAIM, and finally, part VI offers some conclusions and suggestions to
improve the political feasibility of an emissions market proposal.
II. PRIOR AIR QUALITY REGULATIONS IN LOS ANGELES
Air quality in the Los Angeles Basin24 is significantly affected by
emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), and volatile
organic compounds (VOC). NOx and SOx emissions are generated by
23. See REGULATORY FLEXIBILnIY GROUP, THE OPEN MARKET ALTERNATIVE TO VOC
RECLAIM 11-16 (1996).
24. The Los Angeles Basinincludes the counties of Los Angeles, San Bernardino, Orange,
and Riverside.
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small facilities operating boilers and engines, large permitted facilities, and
mobile sources. Regulation of small facilities is accomplished by regulating
the fuel used by the boilers. Large facilities (those emitting more than four
tons per year) have been tightly regulated through the use of source-
specific rules passed by the SCAQMD.
There are approximately 400 large NOx facilities and 40 large SOx
facilities in the district.' Electric utilities and oil refineries generate much
of the emissions from these large facilities. ' The entire group of large
facilities was responsible for 93 tons per day of emissions of NOx and 20
tons per day of SOx during 1990, out of a total of 217 NOx tons per day and
38 SOx tons per day for all stationary sources in the Basin.r2
VOCs are emitted by larger permitted facilities, smaller permitted
facilities, mobile sources, and very small, non-permitted stationary area
sources." There are some source-specific regulations for permitted
facilities, including Rule 1102: Petroleum Solvent Dry Cleaners; Rule 1115:
Motor Vehicle Assembly Line Coating Operations; Rule 1124: Aerospace
Assembly and Component Manufacturing Operations; Rule 1125: Metal
Container, Closure, and Coil Coating Operations; Rule 1141: Control of
VOC Emissions from Resin Manufacturing; Rule 1164: Semiconductor
Manufacturing; Rule 1168: Control of VOC Emissions from Adhesive
Application; and Rule 1171: Solvent Cleaning Operations.'
Within these particular rules, stricter regulations, involving more
advanced technologies and more extensive monitoring, were generally
applied to larger scale facilities.
Stationary area sources of VOCs included individual consumers
using products that emitted VOCs, such as aerosols or hairspray. These
sources were essentially unregulated under the prior CAC regime. In 1990,
stationary area sources were responsible for approximately 409 tons per
day of VOC emissions and large permitted sources were responsible for
approximately 53 tons per day.31
25. For instance, electric utilities were tightly regulated under Rule 1135, "Emissions of
Oxides of Nitrogen from Electric Power Generating Systems," and refineries under Rule 1109,
"Emissions of Oxides of Nitrogen from Boilers and Process Heaters in Petroleum Refineries."
26. See RECLAIM VOL 1, supra note 19, at EX-3.
27. See id. at apps.I-B-1, I-B-2.
28. See S.COASTAIRQUALrrYMANAGEMENTDIST., 1994 AIRQUALrTYMANAGEMENT PLAN
3-6 tbl.3-2A (1994) [hereinafter 1994 AQMP].
29. See id.
30. See generally S. COAST AR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIST., 2 RULES AND REGULATmONS
(1994) [hereinafter RULES AND REGULATIONS].
31. See 1994 AQMP, supra note 28, at 3-6 tbl.3-2A.
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, two pieces of legislation were
passed that required the SCAQMD to significantly improve air quality for
the Los Angeles Basin. One piece of legislation was the California Clean Air
Act (California CAA).Y This act required five percent per year reductions
in nonattainment pollutants, including NOx, SOx, and VOCs for the Los
Angeles Basin.' Soon thereafter, the amendments to the federal Clean Air
Act (federal CAA) were passed.' These amendments identified the Los
Angeles Basin as an "extreme" nonattainment zone,3 and consequently
required the District to develop a plan to substantially improve air
quality.' In particular, it required that every three years, beginning in 1991,
the District would have to submit a plan that contains inventories of actual
emissions of nonattainment pollutants during the previous year, and
describe the rules it would adopt to reduce those emissions.' These
inventories would include both stationary and mobile sources.' Under
Section 182(c)(2), future inventories would have to show reductions in
VOC emissions of three percent per year. 9 Also, under Section
182(b)(1)(A), the District must actually achieve national ambient air quality
standards for ozone by the year 2010.'° In order to do this, as determined
by the District, emissions of VOCs would have to be reduced by
approximately seven percent per year.
While the federal CAA required these significant reductions, in
Section 182(g)(4) it also enabled affected regions to use economic incentive
programs in order to achieve these reductions.42 One economic incentive
program would be a cap-and-trade emissions market. In a cap-and-trade
emissions market, a total emissions level is specified, and then permits
adding up to this level are distributed to sources. The sources can emit only
as much emissions as the quantity of their permits allow. If they have more,
32. California Clean Air Act of 1988,1988 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1568 (Deering) (codified
in scattered sections of California Health & Safety Code).
33. See CAL HEALTH & SAFETYCODE § 40914 (West 1996);see also RECLAIM VOL. I, supra
note 19, at EX-20.
34. SeeClean AirActAmendments of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-549,104 Stat. 2399,2399-2712
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994)).
35. See id. at § 178 (defining nonattainment).
36. See id. at § 172 (describing nonattainment plans in general).
37. See generally id. at § 182 (describing nonattainment plans in greater detail for
Marginal, Moderate, Serious, Severe and Extreme Areas).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 9 182(c)(2).
40. See generally id. at § 182.
41. See 1994 AQMP, supra note 28, at 5-10 tbl.5-2.
42. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,104 Stat. 2399,2399-2712
§ 182(g)(4) (codified at42 U.S.C. § 7511a (1994)).
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they can sell excess permits. If they wish to emit more than allowed by their
permits, they must purchase unused permits from other sources.
This environmental policy instrument is very different from the
instrument typically used: command-and-control regulation. In CAC
regulation, sources are issued permits that are based on the use of certain
emissions-reduction technologies. One source is not allowed to trade
permits with other sources. Under the federal CAA, an economic-incentive-
based instrument such as an emissions market would be allowed as long
as it achieved equivalent air quality measures as a command-and-control
regime.43
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE RECLAIM
PROGRAM
Faced with these air quality problems, the regulatory body
responsible for air quality in the Los Angeles Basin, the South Coast Air
Quality Management District (SCAQMD), needed to create a management
plan that would state how they would achieve their particular air quality
objectives. The traditional approach to achieve these objectives was
through command-and-control regulations. However, the severe nature of
the problem facing the District forced them to consider a more radical
approach. It looked into implementing a market-based program to improve
air quality: a tradable emissions permit market called the REgional CLean
Air Market or RECLAIM. If this program did not succeed, the District
would be forced to instead implement traditional command-and-control
rulemaking, involving substantially tighter controls.
The RECLAIM program was an ambitious undertaking. Prior
emissions markets (lead in gasoline, chlorofluorocarbons, the Acid Rain
program addressing electric utilities) were all addressed to highly
regulated pollutants and sources. For RECLAIM, while sources of NOx and
SOx were closely regulated, regulation of permitted sources of VOC was
much less extensive. And regulation of stationary area sources like
consumer products" was virtually non-existent. RECLAIM was thus an
ambitious attempt to extend air quality control to sources and products
beyond what had been attempted under command-and-control regulation.
When it began developing this program, District staff envisioned
two principal advantages to adopting an emissions market.' One would
be the substantial reduction in costs for the affected industries. The other
43. See RECLAIM VOL I, supra note 19, at EX-20 to EX-21.
44. Consumer products include paints, solvents, deodorants, hairspray, and many other
items.
45. See RECLAIM VOL I, supra note 19, at EX-2 to EX-5.
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was a significant reduction in the costs of operating the regulatory regime
for the District. The process of writing new regulations for all of the
appropriate sources and products is lengthy and complicated. The process
of creating a market for emissions permits, while not simple, would enable
significant savings in staff time, which the District could then reallocate to
other pollutants and to enforcement. Because of these advantages, the
District staff was very supportive of the development of an emissions
market to achieve the reductions in emissions required under the clean air
acts.46 This support is contrary to the public choice theory that regulators
themselves might wish to maintain the status quo of CAC regulation.
The process of developing RECLAIM began with a series of
workshops in 1990 and 1991 that explored the use of markets to improve
air quality.' In these initial workshops, consultants to the district presented
the broad outline for a plan to develop an emissions market to address
these air quality concerns. ' These consultants recommended that the scope
of this emissions market be as broad as possible, including stationary point
sources, consumer products, solvent activities, and mobile sources.49
In February 1991, after these workshops, the District Board asked
District staff to conduct a Feasibility Study to examine different designs for
the RECLAIM program ° At the same time, a Steering Committee and an
Advisory Committee were created, with representatives from industry,
environmental, public health, and ethnic groups, along with
representatives from public agencies." In conjunction with these
committees, District staff generated five working papers, along with a
Feasibility Study Summary: Summary Recommendations document in
March 1992.2 In this document, it was recommended that the scope of the
RECLAIM market include neither consumer products nor mobile sources
at that time.' After a public hearing, the District Board approved this
Recommendations Document, and decided to proceed with the
development of rules for RECLAIM.5'
After the decision to proceed, the two committees met with District
staff to develop rules for establishing an emissions trading program for
46. See id. at EX-1 to EX-2.
47. See id. at EX-6.
48. See, e.g., DAVIDHARRiSON&ALB rNICHO., MARKEr-BASEDAPROACHESTO REDUcE
THE COST OF CUAN AI IN CALIFORNIA'S SOUr COASr BASIN 50 (1990).
49. See id.
50. See RECLAIM VOL I, supra note 19, at EX-6 to EX-7.
51. See id.
52. See id. at EX-6.
53. See FE-ASIBMYSUMMARYRECOMMENDATIONS, supr note 19, at 2-1 to 2-2; RECLAIM
VOL I, supra note 19 at EX-7.
54. See RECLAIM VOL. I, supra note 19 at EX-7.
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three pollutants: nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), and volatile
organic compounds (VOCs).-" They recognized the difficulty of
establishing trading programs for all three pollutants at the same time.5'
The VOC program required significant further study to determine
appropriate allocations and rules for monitoring and enforcement.
Consequently, in February 1993, the District officially bifurcated the
emissions market into a NOx/SOx program and a VOC program and
decided to address the VOC program later.' Because of this delay in the
VOC program, the District began developing new command-and-control
rules for VOCs.'
The NOx/SOx program was, thus, addressed first. The District
proposed a specific emissions trading program for NOx and SOx, and
released the first draft of rules in November 1992." The development of
these proposals was aided significantly by the existence of previously
adopted rules for NOx and SOx, with future implementation dates. After
submitting this draft and subsequent revisions to public workshops, the
final draft was presented in July 1993.'0 The business community liked this
proposal because it used activity levels from non-recessionary years (pre-
1990) to determine starting allocations. 61 They also substantially agreed
with the emissions reduction factors used to calculate future allocations.'
Environmental and public health groups did not like this proposal because
initial allocations were much higher than recent actual emissions.'
Nevertheless, because the program met the objectives of the Air Quality
Management Plan (AQMP) and the affected businesses supported it, the
board of the District approved this proposal in October 1993."
1 The emissions program for NOx and SOx then began operating in
January 1994.6s Throughout 1994 and in early 1995 little trading occurred.
55. See id. at EX-6 to EX-7.
56. See id. at EX-6.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1-4.,
60. See id.
61. See Telephone Interview with Robert Wyman, Partner, Latham & Watkins (Mar. 18,
1996).
62. See id.
63. See Comment Letter #4 from Gail Ruderman Feuer, Senior Staff Attorney Natural
Resources Defense Council, et. al. to James M. Lents, Executive Officer, South Coast Air
Quality Management District (Sept. 7,1993), reprinted in S. COAST AIR QUALIrY MANAGEMENT
D-r., III RECLAIM app.II-I (1994) [hereinafter RECLAIM VOL. I].
64. See RECLAIM VOL. I, supra note 19, at 1-4.
65. See id.
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However, beginning in late 1995, a significant number of emissions credits
were traded." This emissions market is now fairly active.'
Throughout the implementation of the NOx/SOx program,
discussions on the VOC program continued. A variety of technical and
political difficulties arose when the committees attempted to determine
how to properly include consumer products in an emissions market for
VOCs.
Another development that occurred was the release of data on
actual emissions of VOCs during the recessionary years. This data was
collected as part of the 1994 AQMP, and was for the year 1993. This data
showed a dramatic decrease in VOC emissions.8 Under Section 182(c),
future AQMPs would have to show improvements in future reported
actual emissions as compared to these 1993 emission levels.'
In May 1995, District staff released the first draft of proposed rules
for VOC RECLAIM and again held public workshops70 In contrast to the
case of NOx and SOx, there were no previously adopted VOC rules with
future implementation dates to guide them. Consequently, the initial
proposal included rough guesses to calculate emissions factors.71 Industry
groups disagreed strongly with these estimates and protested that they had
no support.' The District officers then conducted a Technology Assessment
study." This was done to determine more precisely what reductions in
VOC emissions credits would achieve equivalency with implementation of
Best Available Retrofit Control Technology required under the California
CAA. 4 This study then served as the basis for emission factors in the next
proposal, which was released in November 1995." Further revisions to
allocations were proposed in January 1996, after District staff released a
revised Technology Assessment.76
66. See South Coast Air Quality Management District, Annual RECLAIM Audit Reportfor
the 1996 Compliance Year (visited June 4,2000) <http://www.aqmd.gov/hb/98042a.html>.
67. See id.
68. See S. Coast Air Quality Management Dist., Steering Committee Meeting (Dec. 5,
1995) (Slide: VOC RECLAIM Allocations vs. Reported Emissions on file with author).
69. SeeClean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,104 Stat. 2399,2399-2712
§ 182(c) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7511a (1994)).
70. See XUAN Vu ET AL, S. COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIST., 1 RECLAIM FOR
VOLATILE ORGANIC COMPOUNDS EX-6 (1995).
71. See id.
72. See Telephone Interview with Robert Wyman, supra note 61.
73. See VU ET AL, supra note 70, at EX-6.
74. See RECLAIM VOL 1, supra note 19, at EX-21.
75. See VU ET AL, supra note 70, at EX-6.
76. See SURESH CHAURUSHIYA ET AL., S. COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DIST.,
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW FOR ADHESIVES, COATINGS, INKS, AND SOLVENTS 1-1 to 1-2 (1996).
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Business groups did not like this proposal because it used
recessionary activity levels to determine individual businesses'
allocations.' These groups also disagreed with the implied predictions of
future technologies that would enable sharp decreases in future
emissions. 8 Environmental and public health interest groups also did not
like this proposal because they felt that it allowed emissions of too much
VOCs because of the way allocations were calculated."
At a public hearing in January 1996, following the latest revisions
to allocations, both large and small business groups declared their
opposition to VOC RECLAIM.' The District Board then voted to kill the
VOC RECLAIM program the following week."
IV. EXAMINATION OF THE DECISIONS CONCERNING
RECLAIM
This history suggests that there were three critical points where
decisions were made that affected the ultimate success of implementing
NOx/SOx RECLAIM and the ultimate failure of implementing VOC
RECLAIM. This article will now examine each of these decisions more
carefully.
A. A Political Economy Model of Decision Making by the District Board
In examining these decisions, the article will explain the decision
of the SCAQMD Board through a political economy model. In this model,
members of the District Board are politicians, whose principal purpose is
to be reelected. In fact, the District Board was primarily composed of local
politicians: some were members of the local counties' boards of commis-
sioners, others were members of local city councils, and the remaining
member was an appointeeby the governor of California. The District Board
can thus be understood to be a group of political regulators.
A variety of interest groups influences decisions about the scope
of regulation and choice of instrment.' These groups influence political
regulators through the provision or withholding of votes, contributions, or
77. See REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY GROUP, THE OPEN MARKET ALTERNATIVE TO VOC
RECLAIM 6 (1996).
78. See id. at 8.
79. See generally Gail Ruderman Feuer et al., Comments on the May 9,1995 Proposed
VOC RECLAIM Rules and Proposed Amended Rules 2011,2012 (July 6,1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
80. See Telephone Interview with Robert Wyman, supra note 61.
81. See id.
82. Possible instruments include taxes, permits, regulation, no action, and others.
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both. There are four sets of interest groups: environmental and public
health groups, consumers, drivers, and businesses. Some of these groups
maybe affected by what is known as "representation bias." Representation
bias is the notion that politicians may disfavor the interest groups outside
their jurisdiction.8
Consumers and drivers may also be "rationally ignorant."' A
single vote in most elections has very little importance to the final outcome.
Consequently, a single voter has little ability to penalize a political
candidate for advocating policies that are detrimental to that voter.
Meanwhile, there are large costs for acquiring accurate information in
order to determine whether a candidate's policies are beneficial or harmful
to a voter. As a consequence, for a single voter the possible benefit from
learning more about a candidate's policies will typically be outweighed by
the costs of gathering and processing information about those policies.
Therefore, individual voters will typically not be well informed about a
candidate's policies and will be "rationally ignorant."
A "political entrepreneur"as may sometimes help unorganized
groups overcome this rational ignorance and other organizational
problems. A political entrepreneur recognizes that a large group of voters,
who might be otherwise ignored by the political process, may have
substantial political power if they can be effectively mobilized. The
entrepreneur then tries to mobilize this group by offering it organization
and information." With the group mobilized, the entrepreneur can then
direct its political power to further the entrepreneur's own purposes."
Nonetheless, the political entrepreneur has a tenuous hold over
this group of voters. This tenuous hold can result in an overreaction by this
entrepreneur in an attempt to maintain his influence. For instance, Elliott,
Ackerman, and Millian describe the effect of political entrepreneurship
during the passage of the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970." At
the time, environmental interest groups were unorganized. Senator
Edmund Muskie attempted to play the role of a political entrepreneur
83. See gnerallyCOMPATIVE DSADVANTAGE?:SOCIALREGULATIONSANDTHE GLOBAL
ECONOMY (Pietro Nivola ed., 1997) for examples of how differences in representation affect
choices made in trade policies.
84. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 3-11 (photo. reprint
1977) (1957) (discussing rationality in general).
85. See James Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 357,
370-72 (James Q. Wilson, ed. 1980).
86. See id.
87. See William W. Buzbee, Brownfields, Environmental Federalism, and Institutional
Determinism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTl L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1997) for additional discussion of
political entrepreneurship.
88. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of
Environmental Law, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313,335 (1985).
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representing environmental interests. However, because of a rival proposal
by President Richard Nixon, Muskie was forced to support another
proposal that included "more stringent" technological requirements on
industry than he "would have preferred."89 Thus, the existence of a political
entrepreneur can sometimes lead to more extreme policies than would
occur when all interest groups are well organized.
To help understand how a political entrepreneur might mobilize
a currently unorganized large group of voters, we turn to triggering
mechanisms. These mechanisms were introduced in two of Paul Joskow's
works on the regulation of utility rates.' Joskow discusses the
circumstances that might "trigger" revisions in utility rates. He notes that
consumers, being rationally uninformed, will generally not request rate
revision hearings when utility rates are constant or declining (on a nominal
basis), even when technological advances have led to significant reductions
in cost. However, rising nominal utility rates are more likely to trigger
requests for rate revisions. Joskow's analysis implicitly assumes that
groups of consumers, when triggered into action, can be a significant
political force. In this case, consumers will not respond to a political
entrepreneur unless a certain threshold is reached.91 When this threshold
is reached, the consumers will be triggered into action. Using these
concepts in a political economy model, we will now examine the decisions
of the SCAQMD Board affecting the implementation of RECLAIM.
B. The Inclusion or Exclusion of Small Sources, Mobile Sources, and
Consumer Products from RECLAIM
During the initial consultations on RECLAIM, consultants
recommended that the scope of the markets for the three pollutants be as
broad as possible. 2 For NOx and SOx, the District considered including
mobile sources and permitted stationary point sources within the scope of
the market.93 Meanwhile, the possible scope for the VOC market included
large stationary sources (emissions greater than ten tons per year), smaller
89. See id. at 337.
90. See generally Paul L. Joskow, Pricing Decisions of Regulated Firms: A Behavioral Approach,
4 BELL J. ECON. 118 (1973); Paul L. Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural
Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J.L & ECON. 291 (1974).
91. Consumers will not respond as long as their expected loss from a political decision
is less than the costs of their response. The costs of their response stay constant, but with
greater effort by the political entrepreneur, the consumers' perception of expected loss from
the political decision may rise to the point where they are triggered into action.
92. See HARRISON & NICHOLS, supra note 48, at 50.
93. See id.
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sources (emissions between four and ten tons)," mobile sources, and
consumer products.
Because large stationary sources within the district have been
extensively regulated under CAC, their possible inclusion within the scope
of RECLAIM would seem to be automatic. Therefore, this article will
concentrate on the decisions on whether to include smaller sources, mobile
sources, and consumer products. It will look at what information was
available under the status quo to groups affected by these decisions, to
determine what they might expect from inclusion versus exclusion, and
will then analyze whether this information might trigger a negative
response to inclusion. Environmental and public health interest groups
were not directly involved in the process at this stage. However, large
businesses were directly affected by these decisions. Therefore, the article
will also examine the counterbalancing influences of these businesses
concerning these decisions and then compare the effects of these responses
on the reelection chances of the District Board to explain the Board's
decisions on scope.
1. Inclusion of Smaller Sources in Future VOC RECLAIM Proposals
Smaller stationary sources of VOCs were relatively less
regulated-compared to large VOC sources-under the prior system.
Consequently, they were less well organized and less informed as to the
cost of complying with regulations. Small sources had the impression that
command-and-control regulations are costly to comply with.9" Also, some
of these sources were familiar with the RECLAIM proposal, while many
others were not.' Those who were somewhat familiar believed that a
market proposal could be less costly to comply with.' However, while
there were some administrative costs associated with compliance with
CAC regulations, those familiar with RECLAIM did expect administrative
costs under RECLAIM to be much higher." Many sources also expected
tighter controls than in the past." While the small sources had some doubts
as to the benefits of RECLAIM, there were no specific threats to the
viability of these firms at this early stage because there was no specific
market proposal. Because they were not organized significantly to begin
with, and without any specific threat to mobilize better organization, the
94. Such as auto body shops.
95. See ECLECTICA, A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS OF PROSPECTIVE REGIONAL
CLEAN AIR INCEnrVS MARKET PARTICIANTS 15 (1993).
96. See id. at 21.
97. See id. at 22-24.
98. See SMALL BUSINESS COALTION, RECLAIM: THE SMALL BUSINESS PERSPECITVE 19 fig.8(1992).
99. See id. at 15.
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reaction of small sources to a decision to include them within the scope of
a proposal at that time was mild."W
On the other hand, their exclusion would have significantly
reduced the opportunities for cost savings for larger sources. This is
because, being less intensely regulated, these sources have lower marginal
abatement costs than larger sources, which had been more intensely
regulated. Because large businesses are well informed and well organized,
the early exclusion of small businesses from a proposal for VOC RECLAIM
would therefore cause a reaction by large businesses. Thus, the District
Board realized that exclusion of small sources at this stage would damage
their likelihood of reelection more than inclusion, and consequently
decided to include smaller sources in the next iteration of VOC market
proposals.
2. Exclusion of Mobile Sources and Consumer Products
Mobile sources and consumer products were even less regulated
than small sources under CAC. This lack of regulation had several effects.
One was that the marginal abatement costs 01 for mobile sources and
consumer products were significantly lower than those for large, heavily-
regulated sources. Large sources had already implemented low-cost
methods of abatement, but unregulated sources had not adopted even very
low-cost methods of abatement. Marginal abatement costs for large
sources, therefore, depend on higher-cost methods. Unregulated sources
could adopt very low-cost methods of abatement, and, thus, had very low
marginal abatement costs.
The gains from trades between these groups consist of this
differential in marginal abatement costs. Inclusion of mobile sources and
consumer products would offer opportunities for substantial abatement
cost savings, as large sources would be able to purchase permits from them
at a lower price than the large sources' own abatement costs. These savings
would lead to higher profits for large sources and to reduced prices for
their customers. Large sources would, therefore, want mobile sources and
consumer products included within the scope of the market.
The lack of regulation also meant that mobile sources and
consumers of consumer products were not organized. Their large numbers
and diversity also contributed to their disorganization. These two groups
100. None of the seventeen letters sent as comments to the NOx/SOx RECLAIM proposal
was written by these sources, or their representatives. See RECLAIM VOL. III, supra note 63 at
app. rn-H (1993).
101. Abatement costs are the costs of reducing pollution. They can include the costs of
equipment to dean emissions, the costs of adopting alternative, lower-polluting processes or
products, and other costs associated with attempts to reduce emissions by a source.
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were also rationally ignorant about many environmental regulations. Their
information about CAC would be based on their current experiences.
Because they would rationally not search for additional information, their
expectation of the impacts of CAC in the future would be a continuance of
the impacts of CAC in the present, which were few. Consumers and mobile
sources would then compare this expectation of few impacts under CAC
to the expected impacts under RECLAIM. However, they would have
virtually no expectation about what participation in RECLAIM would
imply. Nevertheless, these groups could be susceptible to information
about RECLAIM provided by a political entrepreneur. To determine what
information might be provided by a political entrepreneur, we need to
carefully consider the ramifications of the operation of an emissions market
for prices of products generating NOx, SOx, and VOC emissions, and the
corresponding consequences on consumers' and drivers' welfare.
There will be two significant effects on production costs of these
products from the use of an emissions market. First, marginal abatement
costs for some products may be lowered. Second, the permits themselves
will represent a marginal cost of production. Even if permits are given to
manufacturers of these products, so that the underlying profitability of
these businesses is not affected, these permits will still represent an
opportunity cost of production to these firms. This is because, under the
market mechanism, these permits could be sold and used elsewhere.
The total effect on the production costs, then, is a combination of
possibly lower abatement costs and the positive opportunity costs of
permits. For some products, there could be some net savings of these
production costs. For others, the opportunity costs of permits could
dominate, leading to higher marginal costs of production. The incidence of
these cost changes will be shared between producers and consumers,
depending upon the relative elasticities of supply and demand. If demand
is more elastic than supply, producers will bear a greater proportion of the
incidence, and if supply is more elastic, consumers will bear more of the
incidence.
We now need to examine more closely the particular effects of
including consumer products within the scope of the market, and the
effects of including mobile sources. Consumer products were extremely
unregulated, so their marginal abatement costs were very low.
Participation in the market therefore would not lead to any reductions in
these costs. Meanwhile, the opportunity costs of the permits would lead to
higher production costs for these products.
A large portion of the incidence of these higher production costs
would fall on consumers within the district. There would be some
substitute products with lower emission rates (and hence involving lower
opportunity costs for permits) for consumers, so elasticity of demand
would not be very small. However, it is likely that the elasticity of supply
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would be even higher, as manufacturers of these products could sell them
in another region that did not require the use of permits.
The consequences of this incidence could be significant. In early
reports prepared for the District, consultants made very rough estimates
of price changes that might result from inclusion of consumer products in
an emissions market. For instance, the prices of high emitting aerosol air
fresheners were expected to double because of inclusion of these products
in a VOC market.1' Also, the price of high emitting hairspray was expected
to triple, from $2.40 to more than $7.00."°
Meanwhile, consumers in the district would not be compensated
through grandfathered permits. Because of the difficulty in monitoring
emissions generated by individual users of consumer products, the locus
of regulation of these products would be the original manufacturers,
distributors, or retailers of these products. While it would be possible to
allocate permits to one of these groups based on an inventory of prior sales,
it would be impossible to allocate permits to individual consumers because
of inadequate documentation of prior usage.
Groups of consumers would therefore face higher prices without
a compensatory endowment of grandfathered permits. Consequently, local
consumers would be significantly harmed by the inclusion of consumer
products within the scope of the VOC market. Nevertheless, these
detrimental consequences might not trigger an adverse political response
by consumers. Consumers are rationally ignorant and thus would not
necessarily be informed of these detrimental consequences. Groups of
consumers also lack the organization to exert a significant political
statement. On the other hand, groups of consumers are susceptible to a
political entrepreneur. This entrepreneur could be a politician opposed to
RECLAIM, or an industrial interest group adversely affected by this
decision. Here, the District Board would need to determine whether some
industrial group might be adversely affected by inclusion of consumer
products, and, thus, might present itself as a political entrepreneur.
Unfortunately, at the time the board made its decision concerning
the scope of the RECLAIM market, no direct evidence could be found of
the existence of a political entrepreneur at this stage. Some articles did
suggest that the politicians on the District Board were cognizant of the
danger of supporting environmental policies that would adversely affect
the economy of the Los Angeles Basin, which was in a severe recession at
102. See HARRISON & NICHOLS, supra note 48, at 99-100.
103. See id. at 100.
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the time." However, no articles directly identified a political entrepreneur
at this point. Nevertheless, closer inspection suggests some possibilities.
For example, manufacturers, distributors, or retailers could become
the political entrepreneur that would trigger a consumer response. As
pointed out above, grandfathered permits for consumer products could be
allocated to the manufacturers, distributors, or retailers of these products.
However, these permits could only go to one of these groups, not all of
them.1" As a consequence, there would be some group that would not
receive these grandfathered permits. Because inclusion of these products
would lead to higher prices, demand for these products would be reduced.
Consequently, those groups not receiving permits would be harmed by the
inclusion of these products within the scope of the market. For the moment,
we shall assume that local distributors would be the recipients of these
permits. The manufacturers of these products, many of which are located
outside of the District, would not receive any allocation of permits, nor
would retailers.
In this case, the manufacturers of consumer products would be
harmed by the inclusion of these products within the scope of the market
because the higher price for these products resulting from the opportunity
cost of permits will lead to lower demand. Because many of these
manufacturers are located outside of the District, representation bias would
imply that they would not be able to directly affect the decision of the
Board. However, they could serve as a political entrepreneur, and attempt
to organize their customers to express their displeasure with the increased
prices for their products.
These manufacturers would have several advantages in acting as
a political entrepreneur in this case. Individual consumers would be more
likely to find them credible, because these consumers have had experience
in using their products. Moreover, these manufacturers would be able to
offer credible information to consumers that they would be directly harmed
by inclusion of these products within the emissions market. The
104. See Larry B. Stammer, AQMD Rejects Key Smog Proposals in Blow to Businesses, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 8, 1992, at Al ("Immediately after the vote to reject the nine key
proposals, one businessman vowed to mount a grass-roots campaign to oust AQMD board
members who had voted against the pro-business proposals."); Jeffry A. Perlman, Smog Rules
Driving Firms Out of Area, LOS ANGELESTMES, Mar. 17,1992, at B1; JudyPasternak, Complaints
by Industry Spur AQMD Shift, LOS ANGELES TiMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at A3 ("Prompted by
complaints that clean-air rules are driving industries away or out of business, the S. Coast Air
Quality Management Dist. on Wednesday announced a series of reforms of its complex
bureaucratic processes."); Judy Pasternak, AQMD Approves Changes to Region's Clean Air Plan,
LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 13,1991, at Al ("About a dozen pickets outside the hotel's entrance
[at a public hearing of the District Board] held signs reading'SCAQMD Unfair to Business."').
105. If all three groups received permits, a product that generated one ton of emissions
would lead to the issuance of 3 tons of permits, and consequently 3 tons of emissions.
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manufacturers could point to the District's study that estimated the effects
of inclusion on the price of aerosol air fresheners and hairspray.' °6 In
contrast to a study commissioned by the manufacturers themselves, where
there would be a strong incentive to overestimate the effect, these results
would have strong credibility with individual consumers. These
manufacturers could, therefore, present this information to consumers, and
it would seem credible to them.
Manufacturers of consumer products could then offer their
organizational skills to help mobilize their customers who were constitu-
ents of the District Board. With this information and organization,
individual consumers could be triggered into expressing their dissatisfac-
tion with a decision to include consumer products within the scope of the
market.
On the other hand, inclusion of consumer products in the scope of
a VOC market would lead to lower VOC abatement costs for small and
large businesses within the district." All of these cost savings would not
accrue as profits for these businesses, however. Because of elasticities of
supply and demand, consumers of the products of these businesses would
also benefit from these cost savings. However, while these businesses
themselves are not affected by representation bias, a large portion of their
consumers would be. Some of the products produced by the larger
companies included semiconductors, automobiles, and commercial and
military aircraft. A great portion of these products is consumed outside of
the District. While these consumers would benefit, the District Board
would not give their interests much credit. Being unorganized, these
consumers would not make significant contributions to the District Board.
Furthermore, with these consumers located outside of the District, political
entrepreneurs would be unable to tap into their voting power, for it would
not exist.
Thus, inclusion of consumer products within the scope of VOC
RECLAIM would have benefited many in-district businesses, including
many well-organized ones. These businesses should have been willing to
make significant contributions to improve the District Board's chances for
reelection. Inclusion would have also helped consumers located outside of
the district, but these consumers would have no influence over the District
Board. Meanwhile, households within the district would expect to be
significantly harmed by significant increases in prices for consumer
products that generated VOCs. These households also would not be
compensated by endowments of grandfathered permits. While these
106. See HARRISON & NICHOLS, supra note 48, at 99-100.
107. Recall that marginal abatement costs of consumer products are extremely low, while
businesses' MACs are higher.
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households are typically unorganized, political entrepreneurs would arise
to tap into their discontent with this decision. When this happened, the
District Board could expect to feel the power of the large number of votes
that could be affected by this issue. With much of the influence of groups
that supported inclusion of consumer products minimized by
representation bias, the District Board decided that the potential influence
of local households distraught by increased prices outweighed the
influence of local business groups, and they consequently chose to exclude
consumer products from the scope of VOC RECLAIM."~
For mobile sources, a similar but slightly different process
occurred. Drivers have more information about the consequences of tighter
CAC regulations for mobile sources. They are familiar with increases in
gasoline prices caused by these regulations, the costs from "smog check"
maintenance programs, and the costs of additional emissions control
equipment on new cars. They would realize that tighter CAC regulations
would increase the costs associated with all of these. However, they would
also realize that they might have the opportunity to delay some of these
regulations, or lessen the impact of individual regulations.1"
Meanwhile, if mobile sources were to be included in the scope of
the NOx/SOx and VOC markets, distributors of gasoline and automobiles
would be required to redeem the necessary quantity of permits for each
gallon or auto sold. For the VOC market, the story is roughly the same as
the one above for consumer products. Local drivers would bear a
substantial proportion of the incidence of the increased production costs
represented by the opportunity costs of the permits. The beneficiaries of
this would include gasoline refineries, automobile manufacturers, large
local businesses with VOC emissions, and a variety of customers of these
large local businesses, with many of these customers located outside the
district.
For the NOx/SOx market, local drivers would again bear a
substantial proportion of the incidence of increased costs. Beneficiaries
again include gasoline refineries, auto manufacturers, large local
businesses with NOx/SOx emissions, and many customers of these
businesses located outside of the district. There is a slight difference in this
case because local consumers of electrical power would also benefit from
inclusion of mobile sources in the NOx/SOx market. In other words, many
108. See FEAsIBILITY SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 19, at 2-1 to 2-2; VU ET AL.,
supra note 70 at EX-7 to EX-8.
109. Because of the complexity of command-and-control regulatory implementation, it
takes a long time to fully implementCAC regulations. Also, the participatory process of CAC
regulation enables negotiation that might favor sources that are directly involved in the
negotiations at the expense of sources not directly involved.
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of the same people within the district who would be harmed by inclusion
as drivers would be benefited as customers of electrical power.
While the counterbalancing arguments are stronger in this case,
nevertheless many of these benefits from inclusion of mobile sources
would flow to consumers and businesses outside of the District.
Meanwhile, the possible burden on the large numbers of drivers within the
District could be very large. For example, the same consulting study
discussed above estimated that inclusion of new automobiles in a VOC
emissions market could result in an increase in the price of a car by
$1100.110
The District Board could expect political entrepreneurs to arise and
present this damaging information if the Board decided to include mobile
sources within the scope of RECLAIM. It would be difficult to explain to
these drivers that these detrimental consequences would be ameliorated
somewhat by slightly lower electrical rates. Consequently, drivers would
compare the expected higher costs of tighter CAC regulations with their
expectations of costs under RECLAIM.
In this comparison, the effects under RECLAIM would appear
significantly higher than the effects of tighter CAC regulation. While
drivers would expect RECLAIM to raise new car prices by $1100, they
would expect the increases under CAC to be much less expensive. The
current cost of extra California emissions equipment is approximately
$200,1 and drivers would probably expect the additional cost of tighter
CAC to be something close to that. Thus, the additional costs under
RECLAIM would be almost an order of magnitude higher than under
CAC, and CAC would have the additional advantage for drivers of the
delay in implementing new regulations, as opposed to more immediate
implementation of an emissions market. As a result, the District Board
could expect that drivers, informed and organized by political
entrepreneurs, would be triggered into a response by the Board's decision
to include mobile sources within the scope of RECLAIM.
On the other hand, local businesses would support this inclusion,
as would external consumers and businesses. However, these local
businesses would represent a much smaller number of voters, and external
businesses and consumers would not represent any. These groups would
only be able to provide campaign contributions to reward the District
Board for including mobile sources within the scope of RECLAIM.
110. See HARRISON & NICHOLS, supra note 48, at 122. Their estimate assumed that the car
would emit 100 pounds of NOx and 50 pounds of VOCs. See id.
111. The retail price of California emissions equipment on a 1998 Ford Taurus is $170. See
Edmunds.com, The 1998 Ford Taurus LX Sedan, (visited June 4, 2000)
<http://www.edmunds.com/newcars/1998/ford/taurus/lxsedan.htm>.
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Nonetheless, weighing the expected response from drivers within the
District that would be triggered by inclusion of mobile sources versus the
expected contributions from businesses, the District Board decided to
exclude mobile sources from the scope of RECLAIM." 2
After the decisions to exclude both consumer products and mobile
sources, the scope for future proposals would include only large businesses
for NOx/SOx RECLAIM, and small and large businesses for VOC
RECLAIM.
C. NOx/SOx RECLAIM
The next decision for the District Board was whether to implement
NOx/SOx RECLAIM. The Board first needed to develop a plan for this
emissions market. In developing this plan, it considered the constraints
imposed by the legal rights of environmental and public health groups.
In deciding whether to implement this plan, the Board then
considered the reactions of different interest groups. One large company,
the Southern California Gas Company, was strongly opposed to this plan,
while other companies were strongly supportive. Consumers of the
products produced by these businesses were also affected by this plan, and
many of these consumers resided within the District. However, it was very
unlikely that these consumers would be triggered into a negative response.
Environmental and public health groups also responded to this proposal.
The District Board made its decision based on these responses.
1. Background to the NOxISOx RECLAIM Proposal
The plan that the District developed for NOx/SOx RECLAIM had
to meet certain requirements set by the federal and state clean air acts. To
comply with these acts, the District had submitted its 1991 Air Quality
Management Plan (AQMP), which specified how it would achieve the
emission targets set by this legislation.13 In the AQMP, the District set up
two tiers for reduction of NOx and SOx emissions. 14 The first tier was to
be complete by year 2000, and the second by 2003.1"5 If the proposal for
NOx/SOx RECLAIM did not meet these restrictions, the District Board
could expect that environmental and public health groups would then sue,
claiming that the RECLAIM program was in violation of the clean air acts.
112. See RECLAIM VOL. I, supra note 19, at EX-8.
113. This plan was submitted to the federal EPA in order to comply with the California
Clean Air Act of 1988,1988 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1568 (Deering) §172 (codified in scattered
sections of California Health & Safety Code).
114. See RECLAIM VOL I, supra note 19, at 5-13.
115. See id. at EX-10.
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If the District was found to be in violation of the acts, a number of penalties
could be imposed, including elimination of new source permitting. 1' These
suits could be very damaging to the Basin's economy, and, hence,
damaging to the Board's chances at reelection.
Before explaining the proposal, the article will first describe some
of the information available to interest groups under the existing status
quo. One of the important pieces of information provided by the status quo
was the existence of fairly clear endpoints. Hahn noted that the clarity of
the environmental quality goals of an economic incentive program was
important to that program's success,'17 and the targets set under the
District's two tiers of reductions provided very clear goals. Also, NOx/SOx
emissions of large sources were well monitored, so monitoring concerns
would not be expected to pose significant obstacles. Furthermore, both the
industries and regulators had experience in dealing with NOx/SOx
abatement technologies and compliance issues. Indeed, the District had
already adopted many rules with future implementation dates (after 1994
but before 2000).1 After going through the regulatory hearing process,
these rules consequently represented a consensus on what type of
emissions-reducing technologies would be available in 2000.
2. The NOx/SOx RECLAIM Proposal Made by District Staff
Given this information base, District staff drafted a detailed
proposal for NOx/SOx RECLAIM, and presented it in February 1993.19
The facilities involved in this program included 390 NOx facilities and 41
SOx facilities.12 An important characteristic of these was that all were
owned by large businesses. Small businesses were specifically exempted
from this RECLAIM program.12' Mobile sources were not included in the
allocations, although a legacy program whereby facilities within RECLAIM
could generate trading credits by retiring automobiles was maintained." '
One of the most important features of this proposal was the time
sequence of permits allocated to individual facilities. This sequence was
based on three reference points: starting, intermediate, and final
116. Without new source permits, no construction of new facilities emitting these
pollutants could take place.
117. See Hahn & Hester, supra note 3, at 111.
118. See RECLAIM VOL, I, supra note 19 at 5-15 to 5-16 tbl.5-2.
119. See id. at 1-4.
120. See id. at EX-3.
121. See id. at EX-8.
122. This feature was not expected to be widely used and, hence, would have little effect
on equilibrium prices of these cars. Indeed, there was a limit of 30,000 vehicles per year. See
RULES AND REGUATIONS, supra note 30, at 2008-1.
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allocations.1" Allocations for these reference points were calculated by
multiplying the pre-determined "activity level" of an individual facility by
the relevant starting/intermediate/ final "emissions factors." For example,
[Number of Allocated Permits for Starting Year for Facility A] = [Activity
Level of Facility A] * [Starting Year Emission Factors]. Allocations for all
other years were based on a straight-line reduction between the two
surrounding reference allocations.
"Activity levels" refer to the total amount of throughput hours
certain equipment was in use at a facility.1 ' It corresponds with the level
of production of a facility. The activity levels used by the district to
calculate allocations were the maximum reported activity levels from 1989
to 1992 inclusive."2 The method of basing future allocations on past activity
implied that individual allocations were grandfathered.
It is important to note that the non-recessionary year of 1989 was
included in calculating these levels. The District wanted to include a non-
recessionary year because they felt that this would be critical in gaining the
support of the business community.1" Furthermore, inclusion of 1989 was
possible because even with the resultant increases in allocated permits, the
RECLAIM plan still met the targets set in the 1991 AQMP.1
"Emission factors" tell how much of a pollutant is produced from
operating particular emissions-reducing technologies for a certain amount
of time. Starting emission factors were based on District Rules 1109 and
1146, both of which were implemented before 1994.1 These factors were
used for calculating individual allocations for 1994, the first year of
RECLAIM. Thus, during the first year, businesses did not feel a reduction
in their emissions. '
Intermediate emission factors were used to calculate individual
allocations for year 2000.1' The 1991 AQMP had specified some technolo-
gies as "Tier I control measures," and these technologies would be the first
phase of a strategy to reduce future emissions.1'3 These control measures
had already been adopted as District Rules A-C-05, P-B-01,02, and 6; P-C-
02, and 04-08; and P-F-01 and 02.13' These rules had effective dates after
123. See RECLAIM VOL I, supra note 19, at EX-8 to EX-9.
124. See id. at EX-8.
125. See id. at EX-9.
126. SeeTelephone Interview with Jack Broadbent, NOx/SOx Program Manager, S. Coast
Air Quality Management ist., (July 12,1996).
127, See id.
128. See RULES AND REGU AONS, supra note 30, at 1109-1 and 1146-1.
129. See RECLAIMVOLI , supra note 19, at 2002-8 to 2002-9 app.I-A (reprinting Rule 2002).
130. See RECLAIM VOL I, supra note 19, at 5-13.
131. See id. at 5-15 to 5-16.
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1994 but before 2000. The technologies specified by these rules, therefore,
were used to calculate intermediate emission factors.
Final emission factors were used to calculate allocations for 2003.32
To calculate these factors, the District adjusted the emission factors for 2000
to achieve equivalency with the 1991 AQMP emission projections-
essentially, air quality targets-for NOx and SOx for 2003.1" For NOx, the
2003 emission factors represented a 27 percent reduction from the 2000
factors. For SOx, the 2003 factors were 25 percent lower than the 2000
factors.
Under RECLAIM, the District would drop its evaluation of air
quality based on implementation of particular technologies. Because of this,
the District officers were not constrained by particular control measures or
control targets described in the 1991 AQMP. They were, however,
constrained by their previously adopted rules, and by air quality targets set
in the AQMP. These targets were set in order to comply with the federal
and California dean air acts. Because the starting and intermediate
emission factors for RECLAIM were based on already adopted rules,
emissions under RECLAIM satisfied the previously adopted rules.
Meanwhile, RECLAIM also met its air quality targets for 2003, because the
final emissions factors were specifically calculated to achieve those targets.
3. Responses by Businesses Affected by This Proposal
The primary local businesses"u affected by this decision would be
electric utilities, oil refineries, and the natural gas company. Whether
electric utilities and oil refineries would prefer NOx/SOx RECLAIM would
depend on how it would affect their profits compared to CAC. One factor
that would affect their profits would be the difference between the amount
of permits allocated under RECLAIM versus total emissions allowed under
CAC. These differences could arise because of differences in expected
activity levels allowed under the two programs, or differences in the
expected emission factors implied by the programs.
Activity levels under NOx/SOx RECLAIM included non-recession-
ary levels. It is unlikely that utilities and refineries would expect activity
levels under CAC to be substantially higher than these non-recessionary
levels. Therefore, we would not expect significant differences because of
this factor.
132. See id. at 2002-8 to 2002-9 app.I-A (reprinting Rule 2002).
133. See S. COAST AIR QUALIY MANAGEMENT DST., II RECLAIM app.II-C-5 (1993)
[hereinafter RECLAIM VOL. II].
134. Recall that because of representation bias, we will only consider contributions from
local businesses.
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Also, there would be little differences in expected emission factors.
CAC rules were used to determine intermediate factors, so there would be
no difference for those factors. Meanwhile, because the District would be
forced to comply with its 1991 AQMP targets, it would also be reasonable
for businesses to expect that the emission factors implied by future CAC
rules would be very similar to those used in calculating RECLAIM
allocations. Thus, utilities and refineries would not expect significant
differences between the amount of permits allocated under RECLAIM
versus total emissions allowed under CAC.
Utilities and refineries were among the most tightly regulated
sources of NOx and SOx emissions, and they, therefore, had some of the
highest marginal abatement costs. Consequently, because the scope of the
market included sources with lower marginal abatement costs, RECLAIM
would also offer utilities and refineries opportunities to purchase
additional permits at prices that would be much lower than their own
marginal abatement costs." This would enable these utilities and refineries
to lower their costs of production. Additional cost savings from RECLAIM
would be expected in the future, because economic-incentive-based
instruments give stronger incentives for the development of new
emissions-reducing technologies.
Thus, in comparing NOx/SOx RECLAIM with CAC, local electric
utilities and oil refineries would expect substantial cost savings through the
use of RECLAIM. Depending on elasticities of supply and demand, some
of these cost savings would yield increased profits for the utilities and
refineries. In turn, the utilities and refineries would definitely support
NOx/SOx RECLAIM, and be willing to contribute some of these profits to
help reelect the District Board. Indeed, the large businesses affected by
RECLAIM did announce their support for NOx/SOx RECLAIM.1"
On the other hand, while this proposal would help electric utilities,
a competitor of these utilities, the Southern California Gas Company,
would be indirectly harmed by RECLAIM. The lower costs of the utilities
would lead to lower prices of electricity, which is a substitute for natural
gas. The Gas Company could, therefore, expect a reduction in demand,
and, thus, a reduction in profits due to this indirect effect of RECLAIM. As
a result, the Gas Company indeed was a vocal opponent and "highly
critical" of RECLAIM.1
37
135. Recall that they could purchase permits from facilities with lower MAC, and the price
paid would be slightly higher than these lower MAC.
136. See Telephone Interview with Robert Wyman, supra note 61.
137. See Marla Cone, Smog Market Set to Open in Southland, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 28,
1993, at BI.
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4. Would Local Consumers Be Triggered into Action because of NOx/SOx
RECLAIM?
The District Board would also consider the reaction of unorganized
consumers of electricity and gasoline to the NOx/ SOx RECLAIM proposal.
Because these consumers include the entire electorate, they could
potentially have an overwhelming influence on the District Board if they
could be triggered.
It would be necessary for some political entrepreneur to present
himself in order to trigger these consumers. We normally think of political
entrepreneurs as rival politicians, but in this case the most likely candidate
would be the Gas Company. The Gas Company would expect to be harmed
by RECLAIM, but they might expect that their opposition alone would be
insufficient in the face of approval by directly benefited businesses such as
electric utilities and oil refineries. They would, therefore, look for political
allies to help defeat NOx/SOx RECLAIM.
In order for the Gas Company to trigger consumers of electricity
and gasoline to oppose NOx/SOx RECLAIM, they would need some
credible information that NOx/SOx RECLAIM would harm these
consumers. In particular, the Gas Company would need to credibly explain
that electricity and gasoline prices would rise because of RECLAIM.
However, as discussed above, all indications suggested that NOx/SOx
RECLAIM would lower the costs of electric utilities and oil refineries.
Consumers would reasonably expect that these lower costs should lead to
lower prices, not higher prices.
Additionally, consumers of electricity might not trust the
credibility of the Gas Company if it attempted to convince consumers that
RECLAIM would raise electricity prices. These consumers would realize
that the Gas Company, as a competitor to electric utilities, would benefit by
increased electricity prices, and would only complain if electricity prices
were expected to be lower. These consumers would, therefore, place very
low credibility to any statement made by the Gas Company that consumers
should act to prevent increases in electricity prices.
The Gas Company apparently recognized its difficulty in providing
credible information to trigger electricity and gasoline consumers to oppose
NOx/SOx RECLAIM. The Gas Company actually did act as a political
entrepreneur. However, rather than attempting to ally themselves with
electricity and gasoline consumers, the Gas Company instead courted small
businesses." This effort was not very significant because NOx/SOx
138. See Richard D. Farman, Perspective on Pollution. RECLAIM: Can the Regional Clean Air
Incentive Program Work?, LOS ANGELES TIUS, Oct. 13, 1993, at B7. The chief message of this
editorial by Farman, Chief Executive Officer of the Gas Company, was that RECLAIM was
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RECLAIM directly affected very few small businesses. Meanwhile, there
seemed to be no indication that consumers of electricity and gasoline
would be triggered into action by the implementation of NOx/SOx
RECLAIM.
5. Responses of Environmental and Public Health Interest Groups
Environmental and public health groups did not like the NOx/SOx
RECLAIM proposal because, during its initial years, the total amount of
emissions allowed by allocated permits was higher than the total amount
of actual emissions during recent years.1 ' They, in particular, did not like
the fact that the allocation method used peak activity levels rather than
average activity levels.' However, because this proposal satisfied the
environmental quality requirements of the 1991 AQMP, these groups did
not have the ability to sue based on a violation of the clean air acts. The
groups were able to ensure that the program would have significant
monitoring and program evaluation requirements.' However, their
ultimate influence on whether the program would be adopted was
limited.12
6. The Decision by the District Board on NOx/SOx RECLAIM
The District Board then weighed these expected reactions by the
local parties affected by NOx/SOx RECLAIM. They would expect to get
additional campaign contributions from utilities and refineries because
RECLAIM would directly increase their profits by lowering their costs.
They would also expect to get lower contributions from the Gas Company,
because RECLAIM would indirectly lower the Gas Company's profits by
lowering the price of competitive products. They also did not expect a
political entrepreneur to trigger consumers of gasoline and electricity,
because the entrepreneur would not offer credible information that these
consumers would be harmed by RECLAIM. Environmental and public
health interest groups disapproved of this proposal, but their ability to
withhold votes and contributions was limited.'" These groups also were
unable to file a lawsuit on the basis of a violation of the clean air acts,
because the program complied with the 1991 AQMP. Weighing these
"unfair to smaller facilities." See id.
139. See generally Feuer et al., supra note 79.
140. See id.
141. See Telephone Interview with Jack Broadbent, supra note 126.
142. Despite the strong opposition, the program was adopted anyway.
143. The number of constituents represented by these groups was much lower than the
number of constituents who had jobs with or were consumers of the large businesses
supporting the program.
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expected reactions, the District Board voted to approve the implementation
of NOx/SOx RECLAIM.
D. VOC RECLAIM
While the District was able to develop a politically acceptable plan
for NOx/SOx RECLAIM within the constraints imposed under the state
and federal clean air acts, these acts placed even more constraints on the
District's VOC RECLAIM proposal. This article will now examine these
constraints and their effects on the response to this proposal by business
groups.
1. Constraints Placed on the District
Once again, the primary constraints on the District came from the
federal and California clean air acts. The California CAA required firms
within the District to adopt the Best Available Retrofit Control Technology
(BARCT).'" The implications of BARCT for NOx and SOx had been
determined before the RECLAIM proposal was developed, but the
implications for VOC were not known. Consequently, to comply with the
law, the District would first need to determine what abatement
technologies for VOCs should be classified as BARCT. To do this, the
District would need to conduct a technology assessment. Environmental
and public health groups could constrain the District's decisions during
this assessment. If the District was too lenient, these groups might request
a reevaluation of the conclusions on BARCT from the assessment.
The high degree of uncertainty between reported emissions and
actual emissions of VOCs also restrained the flexibility of the District when
developing the VOC RECLAIM proposal. Reporting of VOC emissions is
frequently done by multiplying reported activity levels by given emission
factors, rather than actual monitoring of emissions. Without program rules
forbidding their use, businesses may substitute paints and solvents with
higher actual emissions rates than those used to calculate the given
emission factors. These alternatives are frequently cheaper, and, therefore,
will probably be used in large quantities."45 Consequently, actual VOC
emissions may be much higher than what is reported. This
underestimation of actual emissions would limit the amount of permits the
District could allocate.
144. See RECLAIM VOL. I, supra note 19, at EX-28.
145. See Interview with Anupom Ganguli, VOC Program Manager, S. Coast Air Quality
Management Dist., in Diamond Bar, Cal. (July 24,1996).
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Another constraint was the explicit requirement for continual
actual reductions of VOCs from the federal Clean Air Act.'" While
NOx/SOx RECLAIM did have to achieve substantial, specific reductions
when it ended, District staff had the flexibility to grant initial year
allocations representing a higher level of pollution than recent actual
emissions,14 because they did not have to comply with an explicit
requirement for continuing reductions.
The constraint of continuing reductions became even more binding
because of the timing of the VOC RECLAIM proposal. When NOx/SOx
RECLAIM was proposed and eventually adopted, the most recent AQMP
was from 1991, and the most recent emissions inventories were from 1990.
These inventories from 1990 were one of the benchmarks upon which
NOx/SOx RECLAIM would be judged. Because the recession of the early
1990s hit the Basin in mid-1990, these inventories were only partially
affected by the recession. Additionally, the facilities involved in NOx/SOx
RECLAIM were relatively less affected by the recession."4 Consequently,
1990 inventories acted as a relatively loose benchmark for NOx/SOx
RECLAIM.
On the other hand, when the District proposed VOC RECLAIM in
May 1995, the most recent AQMP was from 1994, and the most recent
emissions inventories were from 1993. The data from 1993 showed
significant decreases in actual VOC emissions.149 For stationary sources, the
planning inventory of VOC emissions dropped from 814 tons per day in
1987, to 745 tons per day in 1990, to 491 tons per day in 1993.ro These
extremely significant reductions in VOC emissions for 1993 showed the
substantial impact the recession had on businesses that generated VOC
emissions.
Meanwhile, the federal Clean Air Act, in Section 182(c)(2), required
that each "ozone nonattainment area achieve actual VOC emission
reductions of at least three percent per year" beginning in 1997.151 The next
emissions inventory after 1993 would be taken in 1996, so it would not be
subject to this specific provision." However, the emissions inventory in
1999 would be subject to this continuing reduction requirement, and would
have to be nine percent lower than the 1996 emissions inventory. This
146. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,42 U.S.C. § 7511b (1994).
147. Something that was protested vigorously by environmental groups.
148. This is because the demand for gasoline and electricity is relatively inelastic to
changes in income.
149. SeeS.COASTAIRQUALrYMANAGEMENTDIST., 1997 AIRQUALrIY MANAGEMENT PLAN,
3-8 tbls. 3-1A and 3-B, 3-9 tbs. 3-2A and 3-2B, 3-10 tbls.3-3A and 3-3B (1997).
150. See id.
151. See 1994 AQMP, supra note 28, at 6-2.
152. Recall that inventories are required every three years.
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would be a significant constraint on the amount of permits it could allocate
for VOC RECLAIM. If the District Board failed to consider these
constraints, environmental and public health interest groups could sue
based on a violation of the clean air acts.
2. Informational Context
Compared with NOx/SOx RECLAIM, much less information was
available under the status quo for VOC RECLAIM. Without a consensual
technology assessment, the endpoints of the VOC program were unclear.
Indeed, little about future VOC emissions-reducing technologies was
known.
While the District did not know much about the specific
technologies, they did have some experience with industry objections to the
development of these technologies. In prior debates over claims of
"technology forcing," District staff found that industry would almost
always say a technology would not be available in the future."
Nonetheless, most of the time these technologies did develop and become
available to the industries."
Another important component of the informational context was the
means that different groups had for processing the available information.
Environmental compliance staffs have a better understanding of the
implications of particular technological requirements on production. They
also are more familiar with the progression of the development of
abatement technologies. When VOC RECLAIM was proposed, large
facilities employed an environmental compliance staff, because they were
needed to assist in ensuring compliance with existing CAC regulations. On
the other hand, subject to far fewer CAC regulations, small facilities
frequently did not employ any environmental compliance experts, and,
thus, did not have as much information about technological requirements
and the development of abatement technologies as large businesses did.
3. Proposal by District
The market proposal for VOC RECLAIM included all facilities that
emitted more than four tons of VOC per year.55 These facilities could be
broken into two groups: those belonging to larger businesses and those
belonging to small businesses. The market would cover 1178 individual
facilities. It did not include consumer products or mobile sources, although,
once again, a legacy vehicle-scrapping program was included.' Businesses
153. See Interview with Anupom Ganguli, supra note 145.
154. See id.
155. See VU EF AL, supra note 70, at EX-7.
156. See id. at 5-13.
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of all sizes were represented, from small paint shops to large motor vehicle
and aerospace facilities.
This article will again look primarily at the allocations of VOC
permits for individual facilities. Calculation of allocated permits followed
the same principle as under the NOx/SOx program. There were two
reference points for allocations for this market: starting and ending
allocations. Other years' allocations were again based on a straight-line
reduction between these two reference points. Again, all allocations were
calculated by multiplying an activity level of an individual facility by
emission factors. The main difference between the NOx/SOx and VOC
markets arose in the details of the activity levels and emission factors.
The activity levels used to calculate a facility's allocation of VOC
credits was equal to peak reported activity levels from 1990 to 1995,
inclusive. 7 All of these years were affected somewhat by the recession that
hit the Los Angeles Basin in 1990. Activity levels from 1989 were included
in calculating allocations for NOx/SOx credits, but they were explicitly not
used here."s District staff did not use the 1989 level because the staff felt
VOC RECLAIM could not comply with the clean air acts if 1989 activity
levels were included. Under the allocations proposed by District staff for
VOC RECLAIM, 1999 allocations were essentially equal to actual emissions
by the VOC RECLAIM facilities in 199 3.1 However, if 1989 activity levels
were included in determining allocations, the total quantity of allocations
would not reach the 1993 level of actual emissions until the year 2001, and
allocations for 1999 would have exceeded 1993 levels by approximately 25
percent.1" District staff felt that these excesses, and in particular having
1999 allocations significantly higher than 1993 emissions, would have
substantially violated the reasonable further progress clause in the federal
CAA.161
Under this clause, in 2000 the District would need to show that
total actual emissions in 1999-including non-RECLAIM sources-had
declined by three percent per year. District staff expected that if
allocations for RECLAIM sources in 1999 exceeded 1993 levels, this excess
157. See id. at 5-15.
158. Recall that 1989 was less affected by the severe recession suffered by the Los Angeles
Basin.
159. See S. Coast Air Quality Management Dist., Steering Committee Meeting (Dec. 5,
1995) (Slide: VOC RECLAIM Allocations vs. Reported Emissions on file with author).
160. See id.
161. See Interview with Anupom Ganguli, supra note 145.
162. SeeCleanAirActAmendmentsof1990,42U.S.C. § 7511a (1994) (describing3 percent
rule).
Summer 2000]
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
would trigger environmental and public health groups to sue under the
clean air acts.' 3
Additionally, District staff was concerned with problems of
monitoring VOC sources. Because of poor monitoring, District staff felt that
actual emissions from these sources could be higher than the amount
represented by allocated permits.'" For District staff, this concern increased
the likelihood that environmental groups would be triggered to sue if 1989
activity levels were included.'" Consequently, the District decided to not
use 1989 levels to calculate peak activity levels.1 "
Meanwhile, emission factors for VOCs were also calculated in a
slightly different way than for NOx/SOx. Starting emission factors for
VOCs were calculated similarly to starting NOx/SOx factors. The starting
emission factors (called "control factors" in VOC RECLAIM
documentation) were used to calculate allocations for 1997."6 These factors
represented implementation of existing rules with compliance dates by the
end of 1996.1'
However, ending emission factors for VOC, used to calculate 2005
allocations, were not based on previously adopted rules, because there
were no existing rules with future implementation dates for VOCs. Instead,
these factors were developed based on "implementation of existing
technologies and short term control measures of the 1994 AQMP. "16e These
"measures" were general descriptions of expected technological
improvements. Because these measures were not specific, the District could
not use these to directly calculate emission factors. A further investigation
of available technologies was needed.
Toward this end, the District conducted a Technology Assessment
and released its results in October 1995."'° The District constructed this
assessment by discussing prospects for future emission reduction
technologies with vendors of the technologies-i.e. companies whose
purpose is to develop and market new abatement technologies-and a few
companies that might use these technologies- 7' This procedure did not
require the same level of evidentiary support as a CAC hearing. It also did
163. See Interview with Anupom Ganguli, supra note 145.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See VU ET AL, supra note 70, at EX-8.
168. See id.
169. See id. at EX-9. The measures this refers to are the twelve "Potential Substitute
Measures" (CTS-A through CTS-L) in chapter four of the 1994 AQMP. See 1994 AQMP, supra
note 28, at 4-6 tbl. 4-1.
170. See VU ETAL., supra note 70, at EX-6.
171. See CHAURUSHIYA ET AL, supra note 76, at 3-12 (listing "key contacts").
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not provide industry opponents the opportunity, also available during
CAC hearings, to present contrary evidence. Nevertheless, it was essential
for this assessment to be constructed quickly and inexpensively, so these
procedures were unavailable.
While conducting this assessment, staff found that the opinions of
vendors on whether a particular technology would be available were
frequently in conflict with the opinions of companies that might use those
technologies."n Because of their prior experience with claims of technology
forcing, District staff discounted the objections of industry users, when
they claimed that a technology would not be available. 73 When faced with
discrepancies on whether a technology would be available, District staff felt
constrained to follow the claims of the vendors." After making these
decisions on the availability of future technologies, District staff then
determined final emission factors on the basis of the conclusions reached
in this assessment.
4. Large and Small Business Groups' Response to This Proposal
Business groups' preference between RECLAIM and CAC
depended upon which had lower expected costs, and hence would lead to
higher profits. These costs depended on the expected total amount of
pollution, self-enforcement costs, uncertainty, and the compliance cost
advantages of one instrument vis-a-vis another.
The article will first examine whether large businesses felt that their
emissions would be more restricted under RECLAIM than under CAC.
This comparison depends on whether there were differences in activity
'levels and emission factors between what was used to calculate allocations
for VOC RECLAIM and what businesses might expect under future CAC.
Large businesses felt that the activity levels used by the District were too
low.17 They expected to eventually recover from the recession, and that
activity levels would return to their non-recessionary levels. 6 These higher
activity levels would be allowed under CAC, because CAC regulations are
set in terms of an average emissions rate, not an emissions cap. As the
region's economic activity picked up, a facility could triple its activity
levels, and still be in compliance, as long as that facility's emissions rates
complied with the regulation. On the other hand, peak activity levels used
by the District to calculate RECLAIM allocations were lower than non-
172. See id. at 3-1 to 3-12,11-3 to 11-7; see also Interview with Anupom Ganguli, supra note
145.
173. See CHAURUSHrYA T AL,supra note 76, at 3-1 to 3-12,11-3 to 11-7; see also Interview
with Anupom Ganguli, supra note 145.
174. See Interview with Anupom Ganguli, supra note 145.
175. See REGULATORY FLEXIBILTY GROUP, supra note 23, at 11 (1996).
176. See id.
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recessionary levels. Large businesses, therefore, expected higher activity
levels under CAC than were used in calculating RECLAIM allocations.
Large business groups also disagreed strongly with the District's
assessment of the development of future BARCT technologies. 1 77 They
expected that technologies would develop more slowly than the district
predicted.178 The groups, therefore, expected that the future emissions
factors used by District staff to calculate future RECLAIM allocations
would be lower than the corresponding emission factors they would face
under CAC. Combining these, we see that large businesses expected that
RECLAIM would involve a significantly lower quantity of permits than
under CAC.'
In addition to these concerns of large businesses, small businesses
also felt that the amount of pollution that they would be allowed to emit
under RECLAIM was substantially lower than under future CAC."s In
their prior experiences with CAC, they were able to comply by simply
adopting the recommended technologies. These regulations sometimes
increased their costs so much that they were forced to reduce their
production levels."1 On the other hand, when these businesses discovered
that they would have significantly fewer permits in 2005, many were
certain they would have to either shut down or move elsewhere.8 2 This
concern was exaggerated by the lack of environmental compliance staff.
This staff would have been more familiar with the expected development
of abatement technologies. If they were available, compliance staff could
have explained to small business operators that technological advances
should account for a great percentage of this reduction in permits.
In addition to higher costs from lower quantities of permitted
emissions, these small businesses also expected to have higher enforcement
costs under RECLAIM. Environmental groups had urged the District to
include certain record-keeping features in the rules for RECLAIM, in order
to demonstrate that the program complied with the federal and California
clean air acts." One such feature was that each user would have to "attach
a unique identifying number to each can of paint or solvent, and to obtain
177. See id. at 15-16.
178. See id.
179. See Letter from Robert Wyman, Partner, Latham & Watkins, to Dale B. Thompson,
Visiting Assistant Professor, Virginia Tech (Aug. 20,1997) (on file with author).
180. See SMALL BUSISS COALITION, RECLAIM THE SMALL BUSIN PERSPECTVE 15
(1992); see generally ECLECnCA, A SURVEY OF ATrruDES AND OPIONS OF PROSPECTIVE
REGIONAL CLEAN Aut INcENIwEs MARKET PARIcIPANTs (1993).
181. See ECLLnCA, supra note 95 at 29.
182. See id.
183. See Telephone Interview with Robert Wyman, supra note 61; Letter from Robert
Wyman to Dale B. Thompson, supra note 179.
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complete VOC data from the manufacturer. " "' Businesses did not expect
to be forced to comply with this very costly requirement under CAC.
Another problem with VOC RECLAIM for these businesses was
that they would bear the burdens of substantially higher risks compared
to CAC.' ss Perhaps the most significant risk faced by small and large
businesses related to uncertainties in technological development. There
were significant probabilities that the VOC abatement technologies, which
were used to calculate future emission factors, might not develop. Some of
the more troubling technologies involved paint coatings and adhesives.'"
Reducing emissions with these products is not accomplished by cleaning
emissions at the end of production as is the case with scrubbers for
NOx/SOx. Instead, a chemical reformulation of the product itself must be
used.18 New formulations may not meet the performance standards
required for the products: coatings and adhesives may not adhere correctly
if reformulated to comply with emissions regulations. This problem is
exacerbated by the high performance requirements of military contracts
with companies in the Los Angeles Basin.
Businesses face much lower risks from uncertainties in
technological development under CAC. Except for "technology forcing"
regulations, before a particular technology is adopted under CAC, the
District staff must demonstrate that it is technologically and economically
feasible. In addition, there are mechanisms that reduce the burdens of
uncertainty even for technology-forcing regulations. After a technology-
forcing regulation has been in operation, if new evidence shows that the
technology does not work appropriately, the requirement of that
technology can be reevaluated. Thus, while businesses do not bear these
risks under CAC, they would under RECLAIM. Particularly because of the
large risks associated with future VOC abatement technologies, these
businesses, therefore, faced higher costs of capital.
On the other hand, large businesses also recognized the potential
static and dynamic compliance cost advantages of RECLAIM as an
economic-incentive-based policy." However, they felt that the restriction
in the scope of VOC RECLAIM significantly reduced the opportunities for
cost savings.'"
184. Letter from Robert Wyman to Dale B. Thompson, supra note 179.
185. Recall that risks affect capital costs.
186. See REGULATORY FLEXUBl1XrY GROUP, supra note 23, at 15.
187. See id.
188. For further discussion of static and dynamic advantages of incentive based policies,
see Dale B. Thompson, An Examination of the Consequences of Political, Administrative, and
Legal Institutions on the Implementation and Performance of Environmental Policies 37, 39-40
(1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with author).
189. See Telephone Interview with Robert Wyman, supra note 61.
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Thus, business groups expected to face higher costs under
RECLAIM compared to CAC, because of lower total discounted amounts
of permits, higher self-enforcement costs, and higher capital costs because
of the burdens of risky technological development. Small businesses
expected even higher costs because they expected that the substantial
reductions in future permits could frequently force them to either shut
down or move elsewhere. These groups did expect some cost savings from
RECLAIM as an economic incentive instrument. However, these businesses
expected the higher costs from lower quantities of permits and increased
monitoring requirements would dominate the potential cost savings from
VOC RECLAIM as aneconomic-incentives-based instrunent.1" As a result,
they both voiced their strong opposition to the program.19
5. Environmental and Public Health Interest Groups' Reaction
Once again, environmental and public health groups opposed the
VOC RECLAIM proposal.1" They again believed that the District was
allocating too many credits because of the use of peak rather than average
activity levels to calculate these allocations. VOC RECLAIM presented an
additional problem because some VOCs are toxic. These groups were
concerned that VOC RECLAIM would lead to "toxic hot spots" because of
trading of VOC credits. 93 These groups then stressed that elimination of
trading of toxics and reductions in allocated credits were necessary to gain
their support for VOC RECLAIM.
6. Rejection of VOC RECLAIM by the District Board
Thus, business groups, environmental groups, and public health
interest groups opposed VOC RECLAIM. While small businesses were
relatively unorganized and could, therefore, impose only limited political
costs on the District Board, large businesses were well organized.
Meanwhile, between the time of the NOx/SOx proposal and the VOC
proposal, the composition of the District Board underwent some changes.'"
Due to these changes, the Board became more receptive to the concerns of
190. See Letter from Robert Wyman to Dale B. Thompson, supra note 179.
191. See Interview with Anupom Ganguli, supra note 145.
192. See generally Feuer et al., supra note 79.
193. Under CAC, each facility has a limit as to how much emissions it can produce. Under
an emissions market, a single facility is allowed to purchase a large quantity of permits and
produce a significantly higher level of emissions. This concentration of emissions can then
lead to a hot spot.
194. To see these changes, compare the board composition between the 1994 and 1997
AQMPs, found in each year's AQMP.
[Vol. 40
IMPLEMENTATION OF EMISSIONS MARKETS
industry.1" In other words, these changes in the composition of the board
increased the magnitude of the political costs business groups could
impose on the board. In addition to the opposition of business groups,
environmental and public health groups again opposed VOC RECLAIM.
Within a week of the meeting where business groups announced their
opposition, the District Board voted to end the VOC RECLAIM program.'"
V. OBSTACLES AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RECLAIM
The above explanations of the Board's decisions to implement
some, but not all, of RECLAIM suggest the following lessons on the
political feasibility of emissions markets. One lesson is simply that there
will be significant political obstacles to the implementation of emissions
markets, contrary to neoclassical economic theory. The theory suggests that
there should be efficiency gains from trade by moving toward a more
efficient policy instrument and expanding the scope of incentive-based
instruments. Because of these gains, Pareto-improving outcomes should be
possible in adopting an incentive-based instrument such as RECLAIM, or
by expanding its scope. As a result, it should be politically feasible to
implement incentive-based instruments like emissions markets. However,
our experiences with RECLAIM demonstrate that political barriers remain.
A. Environmental and Public Health Interest Group Opposition Is Not
a Sufficient Political Barrier to Emissions Markets
Another lesson is that these political barriers are not directly
dependent upon the political opposition of environmental and public
health interest groups. Environmental and public health interest groups did
play significant roles in the formation of the RECLAIM proposals. Their
ability to sue if these plans failed to meet the requirements of the clean air
acts acted as a significant constraint on the determination of allocations for
RECLAIM. They also played an important role in determining monitoring
requirements for RECLAIM. However, beyond these constraints and
monitoring concerns, the influence of these groups was limited. These
groups voiced strong opposition to both NOx/SOx RECLAIM and to VOC
RECLAIM. Their concerns were very similar in both cases. In contrast,
business groups, for the most part, supported NOx/SOx RECLAIM and
opposed VOC RECLAIM. In the end, NOx/SOx RECLAIM was approved,
while VOC RECLAIM was terminated. The rational conclusions drawn
195. See Telephone Interview with Jack Broadbent, supra note 126; Telephone Interview
with Robert Wyman, supra note 61.
196. See Interview with Anupom Ganguli, supra note 145.
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from these two case studies are that the opposition of environmental and
public health groups to RECLAIM was not sufficient to stop the
implementation of NOx/SOx RECLAIM, and that this opposition played
only a small part in the demise of VOC RECLAIM. The political opposition
of environmental and public health interest groups is, therefore, an
insufficient explanation for the failure to implement an emissions market
like RECLAIM.
B. Political Barriers Presented by Consumer Groups
Another lesson concerns the barrier presented by consumer
groups. Prior to our experiences with RECLAIM, we would not have
expected consumer groups to present significant barriers to the
implementation of emissions markets. However, the combination of
difficulties in enforcement, the possibility of political entrepreneurs, and
representation bias led to the conclusion that it was not politically feasible
to include consumer products within the scope of RECLAIM.
The opportunity cost of producing consumer products would rise
under RECLAIM because RECLAIM permit allocations would represent a
marginal cost of production. The relative inelasticity of demand for
consumer products implied that consumers would bear a large portion of
the incidence of these increased production costs. The standard means of
appeasing groups adversely affected by an emissions market is through
grandfathered permits. However, as discussed above, because of
difficulties in enforcement, this option was not applicable for consumers of
products emitting VOCs. As a result, the consequence of inclusion in
RECLAIM for consumers would be higher prices without any
compensatory mechanism.
Prior theories might suggest that even though consumers would
be harmed by inclusion, they would not have enough political power to
prevent their inclusion in RECLAIM. The beneficiaries of the inclusion of
consumers in RECLAIM would have been well-organized industries. On
the other hand, consumer groups are poorly organized, and are generally
rationally ignorant about the consequences of air emission regulations.
Nonetheless, through a political entrepreneur, these organization and
information problems could be overcome. Once consumers learned of the
expected significant increases in prices, they would likely be triggered into
a response. Through the organization of the political entrepreneur, this
response could be substantial. The significance of this response would be
further enhanced by representation bias, because some of the beneficiaries
of the inclusion of consumer products resided outside of the District.
Meanwhile, the affected consumers would represent a significant
proportion of the constituents of the District Board.
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It seems that the District Board was significantly influenced by this
possibility. Well-organized large businesses strongly supported the
expansion of the scope of the market to include consumer products.
However, the potential political costs imposed by consumers seem to have
led the District Board to conclude that inclusion of consumer products was
not politically feasible. Thus, it seems that in this case, groups of consumers
using VOC products did have more political clout than closely regulated
industrial sources of VOCs.
C. Political Barriers Arising Because of Uncertainty
A final set of lessons concerns increased conflicts caused by
uncertainty. Political problems also prevented the use of the more efficient
instrument of an emissions market for controlling VOC emissions of
business sources. In this case, these problems derived from underlying
uncertainty.
Uncertainty is normally thought of as troublesome because of
social costs associated with the variance of an uncertain variable. In Martin
Weitzman's article,' the reason for the advantage of quantity instruments
over price instruments was that quantity instruments led to a lower
variance with respect to environmental quality.
Uncertainty causes another problem when distributive politics are
considered. When trying to estimate an uncertain variable, different groups
will have different opinions on that variable's mean. When regulators must
choose some estimate of the disputed mean, their choice will necessarily
generate distributional consequences.1 As a result, uncertain variables
present potential policy problems not just because of the variances
associated with those variables, but also because of potential conflicts over
the estimation of their means. In the context of VOC RECLAIM, the
primary sources of uncertainty were two variables: activity levels and the
future development of abatement technologies.
1. Uncertain Activity Levels
The problem of uncertain activity levels has not been addressed
much before. When it was, in Butler and Maher,'" they found that a
quantity-based instrument like RECLAIM achieved an efficient solution.
197. See generally Weitzman, supra note 20.
198. The ultimate choice of the estimate will represent a division in allocation. For
instance, in estimating technological advances of abatement technology, the estimate of this
advance will divide our endowment of environmental quality between sources that pollute
and groups that value an unpolluted environment.
199. See generally Butler & Maher, supra note 20.
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However, their focus was on the social consequences of the variance of
activity levels, not their mean.
Experiences with RECLAIM suggest that when the magnitude of
the uncertainty pertaining to activity levels is great, determining the
expected mean can create significant political conflicts. Under NOx/SOx
RECLAIM, there was relatively less underlying uncertainty because these
businesses were relatively less affected by recessions. Also, the District was
not significantly constrained on its choice of the expected mean of activity
levels because it did not need to continually reduce emissions, only reach
a specified end point. As a result, the estimated activity levels posed a small
political barrier, in the form of opposition of environmental groups.
On the other hand, for VOC RECLAIM, there was a significantly
greater amount of underlying uncertainty, and much tighter constraints on
the District's decision. The estimated means of activity levels chosen by the
District for VOC RECLAIM were significantly lower than business groups'
estimated means.2" Businesses therefore felt that their burden from
uncertain activity levels would be substantial. 1 This difference of opinion
on expected means had significant political consequences because business
groups do not bear any burden from uncertain activity levels under CAC.
Because of this large discrepancy in burdens, business groups were willing
to impose significant political costs on the District if VOC RECLAIM were
adopted.
• ; Moreover, in addition to these political problems associated with
estimating the mean of uncertain activity levels, we also cannot apply
Butler and Maher's ° conclusion that permit systems would be the efficient
means for managing the consequences of the variance of uncertain activity
levels. Their result depended upon their focus on growth as the source of
changes in activity levels. Because growth causes new entrants, the
Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve is pivoted out.'
Recall Weitzmans' conclusion that whether a quantity or price
instrument is more efficient depends on the relative steepness of the MAC
curve versus the Marginal Damage (MD) curve.' Because the pivot makes
the MAC curve less steep, quantity-based instruments such as permit
200. See REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY GROUP, supra note 23, at 11-14.
201. See id.
202. See generally Butler & Maher, supra note 20.
203. See infra fig.A.
204. See generally Weitzman, supra note 20.
205. If the marginal benefit to society of pollution reduction is steeper than the marginal
cost of abating that pollution, thena quantity-setting policy instrument willbe more beneficial
than a price-setting one. Similarly, a price-setting policy instrument will be preferred if the
marginal cost curve is steeper than the marginal benefit curve. For further discussion, see Dale
B. Thompson, supra note 188, at 118.
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systems become more attractive than price-based instruments such as
taxes. Eventually, as expansion continues, the quantity-based instrument
must become the preferred instrument, and this explains Butler and
Maher's conclusion.
Our experience with RECLAIM suggests another source: business
cycles. While VOC producers were greatly affected by business cycle
fluctuations, NOx/SOx producers were not, and this difference played a
major role in the differential successes of the programs. The importance of
business cycles for permit systems was not noted before, because they
played no role in our earlier experiences with lead trading and emissions
trading. These expansions will have significant implications on the
efficiency of pure permit systems. With the business cycle, expansion
occurs from greater use of existing capacity. This increased use of existing
capacity will not affect the underlying marginal production / reduction of
pollution properties of the equipment. What happens instead is that
business expansion brings more profitable opportunities, i.e. the price for
the primary product rises.
To understand these effects, we can think of the marginal
abatement cost curve through its dual production role: pollution as a factor
of production, rather than as a by-product. The MAC curve then is actually
the marginal revenue product (MRP) curve of pollution. As a business
cycle expansion occurs, the marginal physical product (MPP) of pollution
does not change, because the underlying equipment and technologies do
not change. Recall that the MRP curve is simply the MPP curve multiplied
by price. An increase in price, therefore, will simply shift the MRP curve
up. Consequently, during a business cycle expansion, as the price of the
primary good rises, the whole MRP curve, i.e. the MAC curve, of pollution
shifts up.M
This results in different welfare conclusions compared to a pivot.
The resulting MAC curve has the same slope as the previous one. Because
the relative slopes have not changed, we no longer can say that the permit
system has become more attractive, as is the case under the Butler and
Maher expansion. Instead, if a tax system was preferable prior to the
expansion because the prior MAC curve was steeper than the MD curve,
a tax system will remain preferable after the expansion. This is because the
new MAC curve must remain steeper than the MD curve, because the
slopes of both curves have not changed. We, thus, may reach the opposite
conclusion on the efficiency of quantity-based instruments under a
business cycle expansion than Butler and Maher's conclusion.
Thus, our experiences with RECLAIM demonstrate that quantity-
based instruments may not be the most efficient way to manage losses
206. See infra fig.B.
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related to the variance of uncertain activity levels. More importantly, these
experiences stress the significant political obstacles that arise due to
differences of opinion of the expected mean of activity levels. Although
earlier analyses focused on the effects of the variances of uncertain
variables, RECLAIM points out that distributional political consequences
of estimating activity levels have a much more significant impact on the
political feasibility of marketable permit systems.
2. Uncertain Technological Change
Uncertainties related to technological change have been discussed
before. In these earlier analyses, authors noted that permit systems put the
risks associated with technological change on polluters.' Our experiences
with RECLAIM suggest that, in addition to these risk factors, differences
of opinion over the expected mean of technological advances also result in
political obstacles to marketable permit systems.
For NOx/SOx RECLAIM, already-adopted rules with future-
implementation dates represented a consensus on how quickly future
technologies would develop. This consensus implied that there was a small
degree of uncertainty associated with the development of abatement
technologies for these heavily regulated pollutants. Another consequence
of this consensus was that businesses would face the same burden related
to uncertain technological change under RECLAIM as under CAC because
the CAC rules were the basis for RECLAIM. With no differences in burden,
businesses did not have any reason to object to RECLAIM. Thus, when
there is a consensus on the future development of abatement technologies,
marketable permit systems will not encounter political barriers arising due
to uncertain technological change.
However, for VOC RECLAIM, there were no already-adopted rules
with future-implementation dates. Instead, there was a large degree of
uncertainty concerning the development of VOC abatement technologies.
Businesses predicted a very slow development. Technology vendors
expected development to proceed much more rapidly, and the District
eventually accepted the vendor's views.
Businesses believed that their views would more likely be upheld
under the stricter evidentiary requirements of CAC rulemaking hearings.
They therefore believed that the District's choice on the expected mean of
technological advancements meant that they would face a much higher
burden arising from uncertain technological change under RECLAIM.'
207. Seegenerally RogerG. Noll, InstrumentChoice in Environmental Policy (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
208. Uncertainty in technological change means that some party will have to bear the
burden of this risk.
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Because these burdens were significantly different, businesses were willing
to impose significant political costs on the District if VOC RECLAIM were
adopted.
Again, in addition to the variances of technological change,
business groups were very concerned with the estimated means of
technological change represented by VOC RECLAIM. Just as with activity
levels, our experiences with RECLAIM demonstrate that the distributional
political consequences of estimating these means can have a significant
impact on the political feasibility of marketable permit systems.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE
EMISSIONS MARKETS
Thus, the SCAQMD Board was able to promote considerable
efficiencies in the control of NOx and SOx emissions by the adoption of
NOx/SOx RECLAIM. The advantages of this program to large businesses
located within the District generated the political support necessary for this
program to be implemented. Meanwhile, this program did not trigger
effective opposing responses by other groups. Local consumers of electrical
power and drivers were not triggered into a response by a political
entrepreneur because they expected to be helped and not harmed by the
implementation of NOx/SOx RECLAIM. The impact of opposition by
environmental and public health groups was low because the proposal met
the requirements of the federal and state clean air acts, and thus there was
no threat of a lawsuit. Other groups that could have opposed NOx/SOx
RECLAIM were subject to representation bias and, hence, raised no
effective response. These conditions enabled this efficient tradable permits
program to be implemented for emissions of NOx and SOx.
Substantially larger efficiency gains were expected from expanding
the scope of RECLAIM to include consumer products and mobile sources.
Despite these large efficiency gains, local consumers and drivers could be
significantly worse off under the RECLAIM program than under additional
CAC regulations. Drivers and consumers would not receive grandfathered
permits because it was impractical to distribute grandfathered permits to
these groups. Also, the lack of close regulation of these products meant that
inclusion in RECLAIM would not offer opportunities for reductions in
marginal abatement costs for these products. Instead, the opportunity costs
of the RECLAIM permits implied that production costs would rise. The
relatively small elasticity of demand meant that local consumers and
drivers would bear a significant proportion of the incidence of these higher
costs. The expected opposition of these groups stirred up by a political
entrepreneur could then present a significant barrier to expanding the
scope of RECLAIM. While local businesses would support this expansion
and could offer campaign contributions, other groups that supported
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expansion were subject to representation bias. As a consequence, it seems
that the support of these groups was insufficient to counter the expected
opposition of local consumers and drivers. As a result, the District Board
decided to not include consumer products or mobile sources within the
scope of RECLAIM, despite the large efficiency gains from doing so.
Substantial efficiency gains were also expected from adopting a
tradable permits market for the remaining sources of VOC emissions.
However, in this case, conflicts arising due to uncertainty prevented the
formation of a mutually agreeable compromise for VOC RECLAIM. Future
activity levels of VOC sources and the future development of VOC
abatement technologies presented significant uncertainties. Feeling
constrained by environmental and public health interest groups, the district
chose expected means of these variables that differed substantially from the
opinions of businesses. Under CAC, businesses would not be subject to the
burdens of these decisions. But under VOC RECLAIM, businesses bore all
of these burdens. As a result, businesses expected to be worse off under
VOC RECLAIM, and they consequently opposed this program. Without
any local group supporting it, the District Board decided to forego this
efficiency-enhancing policy instrument for additional command-and-
control regulations of VOC emissions.
These experiences suggest the following general lessons about the
implementability of emissions markets. Prior theories offered an
incomplete explanation of the political obstacles faced by emissions
markets. The opposition of environmental groups will place certain
constraints on the design of emissions markets, but their opposition will
not necessarily prevent the implementation of a market that has the
support of affected consumers and businesses. Also, as public choice
theories suggest, some groups may fight to maintain the status quo of
regulation through CAC. However, many affected businesses and
regulators themselves may strongly support the implementation of an
emissions market, depending on the design of that market. A closer
inspection of the determinants of these groups' support is necessary.
As neoclassical economic theories suggest, emissions markets such
as RECLAIM offer the potential for substantial efficiency savings.
However, adoption of these systems will not necessarily be a Pareto-
improving outcome. In particular, end-user consumers of products that
were previously less regulated may face large welfare losses compared to
the prior regime. These losses derive from increases in production costs
that result when the opportunity costs of emission permits are considered.
Consumers will bear some of the incidence of these costs, but will not share
in the side-payment scheme of grandfathered permits. The magnitude of
these losses will rise with relatively low prior marginal abatement costs,
low demand elasticities, and high supply elasticities. Nonetheless, even
end-user consumers can benefit from emissions markets when
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implementation of these markets enables the adoption of lower-cost
abatement techniques.
One might think that the support of local consumers might not be
necessary to include previously unregulated products within the scope of
an emissions market. Consumer groups face the significant problem of
organization costs, and many other better-organized groups should be
willing to support the market. However, political entrepreneurs may arise
to overcome the problem of organization costs, and representation bias
may limit the influence of these other groups. Under these circumstances,
it is possible that consumer groups could have more political clout than
regulated industries. Our experiences with RECLAIM therefore suggest
that we must pay careful attention to the possible welfare losses of local
consumers from the implementation of an emissions market.
Our experiences also suggest that we must be cognizant of the
political implications of estimating means of uncertain variables. This
estimation will imply that sources included in a marketable permit system
will face burdens that they do not face under CAC. In particular, conflicts
over the expected pace of technological improvements will generate
considerable political barriers when these technologies have been less
regulated previously. These barriers can also prevent the achievement of
considerable efficiency savings through emissions markets.
These lessons in turn suggest that two steps are necessary before
an emissions market is implemented for VOC emissions in the Los Angeles
Basin. The first is that the District must complete a reasonably accurate
emissions inventory.' This inventory will be necessary to identify the
source categories that must be targeted in order to achieve the emission
reductions required by the federal and state clean air acts. The next step
would be the adoption of a comprehensive list of source-specific and
product-specific regulations for emissions of VOCs. These regulations
would then serve as the baseline for determining allocations of permits
under a grandfathered permit system. In other words, before emissions
trading could be implemented, the District would first need to implement
command-and-control regulations.
With these two steps, the District would significantly reduce the
uncertainty faced by businesses under the VOC RECLAIM program. The
process of determining these regulations would provide a means for
determining a mutually agreeable estimate of the rate of technological
progress. With this uncertainty reduced, the VOC RECLAIM program
should be more acceptable to businesses. Meanwhile, the adoption of
209. The lack of inventories and the consequential barrier to emissions markets is
mentioned in Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework
to Link Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803,858 (1996/1997).
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product specific regulations for consumer products and mobile sources
should significantly raise the marginal abatement costs of these sources.
Consequently, RECLAIM could then offer opportunities for reducing these
costs through alternative techniques. These opportunities would then
counterbalance the increased production costs from the opportunity cost
of permits. This would significantly reduce the possibility that adoption of
an emissions market would trigger a negative response by local consumers,
and they might even support implementation of RECLAIM. Thus, while
the District Board was unable to achieve these significant efficiency gains
with its proposal for VOC RECLAIM, these steps should enable it to
overcome the political objections of local businesses and consumers and,
thereby, lead to the recapture of these efficiencies.
Similarly, our experiences with RECLAIM suggest certain
implications for the future implementation of other emissions markets. It
will be extremely difficult to extend these markets to sources and products
that were previously unregulated under a CAC regime. The CAC
regulatory process frequently leads to a general consensus between
regulators and parties affected by regulations on feasible levels of
regulation. When a regulatory body attempts to extend an emissions
market to cover previously unregulated sources and products, this
consensus will not exist, and significant political conflict will result.
Additionally, previously unregulated consumers and sources may lack
information or the means to process this information concerning the effects
of implementing an emissions market. Without an understanding of the
effects of an emissions market, these groups may present a serious obstacle
to the implementation of an emissions market.
Also, political conflict arising because of uncertainty will be more
contentious under emissions markets than under CAC. CAC processes
frequently include "escape valves" where prior decisions reflecting the
expectation of future developments may be reevaluated when it can be
shown that these developments did not occur. The design of emissions
markets typically has not included such escape valves. Without these
escape valves, affected businesses face significant risks under emissions
markets. Additionally, the magnitude of these risks will be extremely high
when an emissions market is extended into previously less-regulated
sources or products. In these cases, much less is known about the
development of future technologies, and the risks from this larger
uncertainty are, therefore, much greater.
These lessons suggest that command-and-control regulation may
be a necessary prerequisite for the implementation of an emissions market.
CAC regulation can thereby provide information and a general consensus
that are necessary to achieve a political compromise in the implementation
of an emissions market. Additionally, the design of emissions markets
needs to include more flexibility, including the opportunity for escape
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valves. This flexibility may be needed to address the significant risks
arising because of uncertain technological change. With better information,
more consensus on future developments, and more flexible design, the
political obstacles to emissions markets will be significantly reduced, and
these markets will then enable significant improvements in environmental
quality at a reasonable cost.
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